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INTRODUCTION 
On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was in Dallas as part of a five-city 
tour, which would have culminated with a dinner at the Governor' s mansion in Austin, 
Texas. President Kennedy was near the end of his motorcade route in Dallas, when he 
was fatally wounded while traveling down Elm street on his way to the Dallas Trade Mart, 
where he was going to give a speech. As a result of this tragedy, then President Lyndon 
B. Johnson appointed the Warren Commission on November 29, 1963, one week after the 
assassination. Their investigation concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald had acted alone, 
without any conspiratorial forces aiding him, neither foreign or domestic. The House 
Select Committee on Assassinations concluded, fourteen years later, that Lee Harvey 
Oswald had indeed assassinated President Kennedy, but that he was killed by means of a 
conspiracy. At least six government investigations or studies-five at the Federal level 
and one state/local-were conducted into or as a result of the assassination: 
• The Warren Commission's investigation on November 29, 1963 , and completed 
with the public release of its report on September 24, 1964, finding Lee Harvey 
Oswald as the lone assassin. (The Warren Report was itself founded in part on a five-
volume FBI report delivered on December 9, 1963). 
The Warren Commission: 
Chief Justice Earl Warren 
Representative Gerald Ford 
Senator Richard B. Russell 
Allen Dulles, former head of the CIA 
Senator John Sherman Cooper 
John J. McCloy, former president of the World Bank 
Representative Hale Boggs 
• The Clark Panel: an inquiry by a panel of pathologists appointed by Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark in February 1968 who examined the available autopsy photographs and 
x-rays. 
• The Trial of Clay Shaw - the 1968 conspiracy trial brought by New Orleans District 
Attorney Jim Garrison. 
• The Rockerfeller Commission - an investigation of the CIA, begun in March 1975, 
which devoted a section of its report to possible links between the assassination and 
various CIA operatives. 
Nelson Rockerfeller 
Lane Kirkland 
C. Douglas Dillon 
Erwin S. Griswald 
Lyman L. Lemnitzer 
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. 
John T. Connor 
Ronald Reagan 
• The Church Committee - United States Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activiites in 1975-1976 - Also known as: The 
Church Committee - Schweiker/Hart Subcommittee - Book V ofFinal Report: The 
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Investigation of the Assassination ofPresident John F. Kennedy: Performance of the 
Intelligence Agencies. 
Frank Church 
Robert Morgan 
Barry Goldwater 
Phillip A. Hart 
Gary Hart 
Charles McC. Mathias 
Walter F. Mondale 
John G. Tower 
Richard Schweiker 
Walter D. Huddleston 
Howard H. Baker 
• The House Select Committee on Assassinations - begun in 1976 and issued the 
report of"probable conspiracy" on July 22, 1979. 
Louis Stokes 
Samuel L. Devine 
Harold Ford 
Walter E. Fauntroy 
Charles Thone 
Robert W. Edgar 
Christopher J. Dodd 
.., 
_) 
Richardson Preyer 
Stewart B. McKinney 
Floyd J Fithian 
Yvonne Braithwaite Burke 
Harold S. Sawyer 
The following guide is a compilation of data based on the governmental investigation of 
the assassination ofPresident John F. Kennedy during the years of 1976 - 1979. It will 
serve as an easy guidebook for anyone to utilize who wants to know what the salient 
features were of anyone ' s testimony who appeared in public session. I have narrowed 
down one aspect of this investigation to include the fifty-two witnesses that appeared 
before the committee in public session. The majority of the witnessess were specialists in 
a particular field that would lend some type of credence to whatever topic was being 
broached. The House Select Committee on Assassinations held public sessions during the 
last four months of 1978. They wrote a 686 page report of their findings that was 
supplemented by 12 volumes of testimony and exhibits. The first five volumes contain the 
public testimony of the 52 witnesses. This particular study will not include depositions, 
affidavits or any of the executive sessions. It will also not include interviews that were 
taken by investigators. One of the reasons for this is the unavailability of some or most of 
these documents. Since the Assassinations Records Review Board commenced in 1992, 
many documents and files have been released. Since all have not been released at this 
point, only a fragmented study would be possible. 
A brief history of the formation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations will 
be presented during the testimony of Robert Groden, since he was vitally instrumental in 
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the formation of the House Committee. The majority of the project will be the 52 
witnesses synthesized and encapsulated as to what they testified to before the committee 
and what each of their salient points were. 
PURPOSE 
My study will serve as a handy guide to anyone who is interested in knowing what was 
stated in public testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations. It will 
be a time-saver for those who care to see the material synthesized in a readable fashion. 
Many people who don't have the time to do all of the tedious reading and research will be 
able to access the information quickly and easily without becoming encumbered and 
bogged down in the morass ofdata that is always before them in this field of study. 
I will hopefully be able to correct some ofthe sloppy work that has been done in this 
field previously. When I located the only index I could find on the 12 volumes and the 
report ofthe HSCA, I discovered that when the witnesses were listed who appeared in 
public session there was an error in the roll call. This particular book listed fifty-six 
witnesses. I can assure you only fifty-two witnesses appeared before the Committee. The 
public testimony only appears in the first five volumes.I have now read the first five 
volumes of the HSCA five times. Those extra four are not there. This, along with any 
other errors I might discover, will also be dealt with in my project. 
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PROCESS 
I will take the fifty-two witnesses, in chronological order, who appeared before the 
committee in public testimony and do a micro-study of their testimony. It will serve as an 
easy guidebook for anyone who wants to know what the salient features were of anyone' s 
testimony who appeared in public session. Nine of the witnesses also appeared before the 
Warren Commission fourteen years earlier. I will compare their HSCA (House Select 
Committee on Assassinations) testimony to their WC (Warren Commission) testimony to 
see what the similarities and differences might be. This is not to be just another study on 
some aspect of the Kennedy assassination, but a serious analysis of the most recent 
governmental inquiry into the death ofPresident John F. Kennedy. I will attempt to look 
as objectively as I can at the data and let the testimony speak for itself 
The Warren Commission's conclusions will be compared with that of the HSCA's 
when there is a need to demonstrate the differences between the two investigations. This 
will only arise in this study if the public testimony shows a necessity to do so for the sake 
ofcontrast and clarity. When I am finished, anyone who wants to know what any witness 
that appeared in public session said will be able to locate it quickly and find an exegesis of 
that person's testimony. 
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BACKGROUND/QUALIFICATIONS 
Chief Counsel of The House Select Committee on Assassinations, G. Robert Blakey, 
introduced almost every witness with a narrative that announced the area of expertise of 
the person who was about to be interviewed. I will attempt to do the same when 
necessary. I will also read the testimony of the HSCA witnesses before the Warren 
Commission, as a way to compare and contrast their testimony for any relevant similarities 
or differences. I have secured the 686-page Report with the accompanying 12 volumes of 
testimony and exhibits on CD-ROM to be able to access the data that in a quick and easy 
manner. I have also secured the 888-page Report known as the Warren Report with the 
accompanying 26 volumes of testimony and exhibits on CD-ROM. I have also been able 
to obtain over 150 books , magazines, and photographs to help stay up on the current data 
and controversies. I have checked out most of the web sites on the subject and am in the 
process of putting together a web site of my own. Hopefully it will be completed soon. I 
have corresponded with some of the most respected researchers in the field via e-mail. 
interact with both Warren Commission advocates and conspiracy advocates alike. I am 
also on the e-mail list of the Assassination Records Review Board to stay up on the latest 
revelations of the files that are being released. These will only be mentioned if they play a 
role or are connected with the 52 witnesses of the HSCA. In view of the great mass of 
data on the subject, I must stay confined to my rigid focus for fear of not being thorough 
on my own subject. In recent months I have been fortunate enough to have been asked to 
give an occasional public lecture on the subject of the JFK Assassination with video and 
slides as a tool to demonstrate my particular findings on the subject. It has been an 
interest of mine for about 23 years. 
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I 
-PREVIOUS WORK 
When I perused all of the data on the subject I found an enormous amount ofmaterial 
on the Warren Commission and their findings. Entire books had been written on the 
subject, with the witnesses being analyzed and indexes compiled after the findings had 
been published. This was done because the Warren Commission provides no index to all 
of the 26 volumes oftestimony and exhibits. The House Select Committee on 
Assassinations has gone virtually untouched as far as books being written on the subject. 
When I searched the literature on the HSCA, I found a lot of references on the subject 
scattered throughout a multitude of different books. There was not one book that dealt 
with the investigation of the HSCA in any systematic fashion. Ifyou wanted to know 
what any of the witnesses said in public testimony, you had to search the indexes ofa 
number ofbooks hoping to piece together some kind ofcoherent pattern to your inquiry. 
What I am doing has never been done before in any systematic fashion. 
This is not a project that has any hidden agenda to promote. It will simply be a 
compilation ofdata that can serve as a guidebook for those interested in investigating this 
aspect of the case involving the House Select Committee on Assassinations. It will be 
thorough and serious in its approach. Finally, my hope is that the writing will be clear 
without being plain, and elevated without being obscure. 
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001: John B. Connally September 6, 1978 (w/Mrs. Nellie Connally) 
John Connally was the governor ofTexas in 1963. He was also riding in the limousine 
with President Kennedy on that fateful day in Dallas. He was the first of 52 witnesses 
called to testify in the Public Hearings before The House Select Committee on 
Assassinations. He was one of9 people who appeared before the Warren Commission, 
who would also appear before the House Select Committee on Assassinations. For the 
most part he simply repeated his testimony before the Warren Commission fourteen years 
earlier. In fact, he never deviated from his original testimony until the day he died. 
Connally states, again, that he heard the first shot and it did not hit him. Mrs. Connally 
said she also heard the first shot, turned to her right and saw JFK clutching his throat. 
Gov. Connally said after he heard the first shot he attempted to get a glimpse of JFK by 
turning to his right, but was unable to see the President and was in the process of turning 
back to his left when he felt as if someone hit him in his back with a doubled-up fist . Now 
ifGov. Connally was sitting inboard ofJFK, then he should have been able to see him, 
hence the need to turn back to his left. The Zapruder film clearly indicates the same 
scenario. Remember, the "single bullet theory" states that the bullet was traveling from 
right to left, which of course would make Gov. Connally an unlikely target in the plot. 
Gov. Connally says he didn't hear the second shot, probably because the bullet was 
traveling faster than the speed of sound. When Mr. Devine, a member ofthe House 
Committee on Assassinations, began his questioning ofthe Governor and his wife, he said 
he knew that the Governor appeared before the Warren Commission, but wasn't sure if his 
wife, Nellie, had. It makes one at least wonder ifhe even read any oftheir testimony, 
because if he had read the record he certainly would have known Mrs. Connally testified, 
since she appeared with her husband. The juxtaposition of the two appearances would 
have at least permitted the possibility offleshing out some details. The Committee 
members who were asking the questions ought to have been better prepared. When being 
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questioned by Mr. Edgar, Gov. Connally suggested that he "might" have put his right hand 
on his left thigh, giving plausibility to the wrist and thigh wounds. The Zapruder film does 
not indicate this. 
The combined testimony of the Governor and his wife seemingly destroys the 
possibility ofthe Single Bullet Theory. It is an easy progression: 1st shot hit JFK as he is 
seen clutching his throat by Mrs. Connally. 2nd shot hit the Governor as he and she so 
testified. The 3rd shot hit JFK in the head (Z-313 ), as they both testified. 
In a statement before the Warren Commission, Gov. Connally testified that although he 
was keenly aware of the chest wound, he had no idea at the time that he had been 
wounded in the wrist or thigh (WC Hearings, IV, 135). Perhaps the pain of the chest 
wound blocked out any sensation from the others; perhaps they occurred after he went 
into shock from the chest wound. 
Initially, Gov. Connally gave nothing more than a primer, albeit interesting, ofTexas 
politics and its many machinations. He probably told the Committee more than it needed 
to know about the tension between Senator Yarborough and Vice-President Johnson. His 
comments are interesting, but totally unrelated to the assassination. The oddity is that 
despite the combined testimony of the Governor and his wife, which seems to discredit the 
Single Bullet Theory (the sine qua non of the Warren Commission), he stated repeatedly 
until the very end ofhis life that he didn't believe in a conspiracy and rubber stamped the 
Warren Commission and their findings. 
The House Select Committee on Assassinations chose not to believe Gov. Connally 
about his perception of the shots. Neither the Warren Commission nor the House Select 
Committee on Assassinations played word games with this witness. He knew about guns, 
and he was there. They did, however, choose to believe that he was mistaken about the 
sequence of the shots. It is odd that someone who knew about rifles and was there was 
disbelieved, whereas a junior counsel with no experience with rifles and who wasn't there 
was believed. 
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002: Mrs. John B. Connally September 6, 1978 (w/Gov. John B. Connally) 
Mrs. Connally testified with her husband before The House Select Committee on 
Assassinations, just as she did before The Warren Commission in 1964. She seems to 
speak forthrightly and with confidence. She states, "I know it was the second shot that hit 
the Governor." To quote, "I heard three shots, I had three reactions, three separate 
reactions. The first shot, then I looked and saw the President, the second shot, John, and 
third, all this matter all over us." The interrogators attempt to downplay this by getting 
Mrs. Connally to speculate about whether she was looking at the President or her husband 
when the second shot was fired. When this comes up in talking with Mr. Dodd, she said 
she thinks she was looking at the President when her husband was hit with the second 
round ofgunfire. She said the President reacted to the first gunshot by clutching at his 
throat, while the Governor seemed to indicate no reaction at all. 
Mrs. Connally corroborated the earwitness portion of her husband' s testimony, though 
obviously she had no knowledge ofwhich wounds he felt and when. She testified to 
hearing Mrs. Kennedy say, after the third shot, "I have his brains in my hand." Mrs. 
Connally had stated the same thing before the Warren Commission (WC Hearings, IV, 
148). 
When Mr. Devine began questioning Mrs. Connally, he said he is not sure if she 
testified before the Warren Commission (see Gov. Connally's testimony). Didn't he know 
he was going to question her? Didn't he want to compare her Warren Commission 
testimony with what she was going to say before The House Select Committee on 
Assassinations? This is all about being informed, not necessarily trying to deceive her. 
When questioned regarding the Grassy Knoll, there doesn't seem to be much space given 
to its possibility as a position for an assassin. This seems odd since the acoustical analysis 
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led the HSCA to determine that a possible conspiracy did exist with the grassy knoll as the 
place where the frontal shooter was stationed. 
When Mrs. Connally and her husband testify you certainly get the impression they are 
telling the story exactly as they remember it. They thought all of the shots came from the 
direction of the Texas School Book Depository. 
003: Robert J. Groden September 6, 1978 
Robert Groden was a photo-optical technician who had enhanced the Zapruder film in 
his private time and had been partially responsible for many members of Congress 
becoming convivnced to reopen the Kennedy assassination case. 
The formation of The House Select Committee on Assassinations really began with 
Robert Groden. On March 6, 1975, on ABC-TVs Goodnight America, Groden showed 
his optically enhanced version of the Zapruder film. There may never have been a second 
investigation into the assassinations ofPresident John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. without this public display and the public outcry that followed the presentation of 
the Zapruder film on national television. 
The House Select Committee on Assassinations was established in September 1976 by 
House Resolution 1540, which authorized a full and complete investigation of the 
circumstances surrounding the deaths ofPresident Kennedy and Dr. King. The committee 
expired as the term of the 94th Congress ended on January 3, 1977. On February 2, 1977, 
the House passed HR 222, again authorizing the committee and directing it not only to 
investigate the deaths ofPresjdent Kennedy and Dr. King, but also to determine whether 
existing laws that cover assassination are adequate. The House also wanted to see ifthere 
had been a full sharing of information by federal agencies during the course of prior 
investigations. HR 222 extended the committee for only two months. Another resolution, 
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HR 433 , was passed on March 30, 1977, constituting the committee until January 3, 
1979. Although the critics had lobbied diligently for congressional action, the principal 
impetus for the overwhelming political support of HR 1540 (it passed the House by a vote 
of 280 to 65) came from another source - the Final Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. In its 
report, dated April 1976, the Senate committee published revelations that raised in the 
minds of many the serious possibility of government complicity in both assassinations. 
Groden, a photographic consultant to the Committee who had made the famous optical 
enhancement of the Zapruder film, testified. He was not allowed to mention his findings 
of forgery in the autopsy photographs, or to state that the Committee' s synchronization of 
the recorded shots to the Zapruder film was incorrect. 
Congressman Richardson Preyer asked him, "From the Zapruder film and your analysis 
of that, is it your opinion that the first shot that hit President Kennedy also hit Governor 
Connally? I wasn't quite clear on your description of that" (HSCA Hearings, I, 61-140). 
Groden replied: "It would appear photographically that analysis of the film would show 
that the two men were struck by at least two if not more separate nonfatal shots prior to 
the head shot-" 
"Would you say that again, each man was hit by at least two shots?" Preyer asked. 
' 'No, more than the single bullet was involved in the actual nonfatal wounding of both 
men." 
''But you are not giving your opinion as to whether the shot which hit President 
Kennedy in the throat, the first shot, whether that was the shot that hit Governor Connally 
or not?" 
"I do not believe that they are the same bullet. I severely question that particular 
conclusion." 
''Have any questions been raised about the Kennedy autopsy photographs?" Preyer 
asked Groden (HSCA Hearings, I, 129). 
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"The autopsy photographs also came into a great deal of challenge by the Warren 
Commission critics in that the reports dealing with the autopsy photographs from different 
groups going into the Archives to view them gave such markedly different results, at least 
verbal results, as described in relationship to each other and to the medical personnel at 
Parkland Hospital who seem to describe totally different wounds than those seen in the 
photographs described." 
''Fine." That was as far as Groden was allowed to go on the subject of the autopsy 
photographs. Most significantly, however, the Committee did publish Groden's statement 
that the photos were forged. Groden went on to say that the famous "backyard" 
photographs of Oswald holding a rifle and radical publications were fake too, with a face 
pasted onto someone else's body (HSCA Hearings, I, 124). 
Robert Groden was asked to testify before the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations in order to put all of the issues of the critics (those who oppose the lone-
assassin theory of the Warren Commission) on the table for the committee to compare 
with the Warren Commission. 
004: Ida Dox Septem her 7, 1978 
Ms. Dox was a graduate from Johns Hopkins Medical School, Department of Art as 
applied to Medicine. At the time of the public hearings, she was a medical illustrator for 
the Department ofMedical-Dental Communication at the Georgetown University Schools 
of Medicine and Dentistry. The Committee contacted the Medical School and Ms. Dox 
was recommended. 
On the day Ida Dox testified before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 
there was a large poster-sized exhibit showing the back of John Kennedy's head. In the 
drawing two hands held a ruler. The rear of the head was intact, except for a small bullet 
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hole near the top. 
It was a photograph ofHouse Committee Exhibit F-36. Behind it were two others, 
one of the throat wound, another of the back wound. No drawing was published of any of 
the autopsy photographs taken from the front or right side, photos which showed the full 
extent of the fatal wound, because those photographs would necessarily include a partial 
view ofKennedy's face . Ms. Dox testified that one such drawing, of the side of the head, 
was in fact prepared, but not shown on grounds of taste. 
The determination on what to illustrate was done by consultation between the staff of 
the committee, the medical panel and Ms. Dox. She initially traced the autopsy 
photographs and then filled in the final details, such as shading, by looking at the 
photographs themselves. She stated in her testimony that she used duplicate copies of the 
original autopsy photographs so as to not unnecessarily use the time of the National 
Archives. The drawings were not schematic representations like the ones prepared under 
the direction of Commander Humes (one of three who performed the autopsy on President 
Kennedy), but precise reproductions made from the autopsy photographs. The drawings 
were so precise that the archivist who watched her at work said he could not tell the 
difference between the photograph and the drawing. 
These drawings were available to the public before the actual photographs were, which 
still, though widely published, have not been officially released. 
005: Dr. Lowell Levine September 7, 1978 (w/Calvin S. McCamy) 
Dr. Lowell Levine had received his DDS degree from the New York University 
College ofDentistry in 1963 . He had been in charge of identification of a large number of 
mass disasters, both in the United States and abroad. 
Dr.Levine, a forensic dentist, studied the X-rays of the skull and compared the dental 
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work with X-rays of President Kennedy's teeth. He testified there was "absolutely no 
question" that the X-rays in evidence were of the skull of the late President (HSCA 
Hearings, I, I 52). His report stated : "It is further my opinion that the unique and 
individual dental and hard tissue characteristics which may be interpreted from Autopsy 
Films I, 2, 3 could not be simulated" (HSCA Hearings, I, 173). 
Dr. Levine was brought in to verify the authenticity of the x-rays. He was 
subsequently used by Gerald Posner to attempt to verify the remains ofDr. Josef Mengele. 
He has been used to verify the skeletal remains of victims of airplane crashes. He is highly 
esteemed and anyone who deals with the medical evidence has to come to grips with the 
findings ofDr. Levine. 
006: Calvin S. McCamy September 7, 12, 14, 15, 1978 (w/ L. Levine & C. Kirk) 
Calvin McCamy received his BS degree in chemical engineering and an MS degree 
from the University ofMinnesota. He was a fellow of the Optical Society of America, the 
Society ofMotion Picture and Television Engineers and the Society ofPhotographic 
Scientists and Engineers. 
Mr. McCamy was a ballistics and photo expert, and one of a panel of 22 experts who 
analyzed the path and number of bullets fired in Dealey Plaza. McCamy testified that by 
checking the batch numbers, he had ascertained that the autopsy films in evidence were 
manufactured in 1963 . He also testified that he had checked the autopsy photographs 
themselves: "We found no disturbing of the surface of the film... nothing taken away ... or 
added ... no evidence of any cutting or pasting or construction of a montage, in short, found 
no evidence whatsoever of any such faking" (HSCA Hearings, I, I 76-77). 
He added that he had viewed the other pictures taken from the same angle 
stereoscopically -- a procedure that would have revealed even minor differences, as might 
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exist ifthere had been imperfect art work. There weren't any. At one point McCamy 
testified: "Suppose .. .we take the possibility that someone substituted a body and that it 
was not the body of the President. Viewing these photographs stereoscopically provides 
the best kind ofview because you can observe not only lateral dimensions but in depth, so 
it provides the best kind ofview for identification" (HSCA Hearings, I, 179). McCamy 
testified that on the basis ofhis analysis, it was "extremely unlikely" the autopsy pictures 
were ofa substituted body, or pictures which had been altered in any way (HSCA 
Hearings, I, 179). 
McCamy, speaking for the a 22-person panel of experts, said virtually all the experts 
agreed that the now famous roll of film taken by amateur photographer Abraham Zapruder 
might show Kennedy and Connally reacting to being hit by a single shot (HSCA Hearings, 
II, 142). 
007: Dr. Michael Baden September 7, 1978 
Dr. Michael Baden was the chairman of the HSCA's forensic pathology panel. He was 
also New York City' s chief medical examiner. The panel included three pathologists who 
had previously reviewed the autopsy evidence and six who had not. In order to provide its 
members with the most complete information available, the panel had specially prepared 
computer-assisted image enhancement techniques applied to the photographs and X-rays. 
It also enlisted the aid of several experienced radiologists in interpreting the X-rays. In 
addition to the photographs and X-rays, the panel studied bullets, clothing, films, medical 
and autopsy reports from Parkland (Dallas) and Bethesda (Maryland) hospitals, and 
numerous articles in professional journals. Finally, the panel members interviewed many 
of the Dallas doctors and autopsy pathologists who worked on President Kennedy and 
Governor Connally. The result of their deliberations is contained in the report that forms 
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the most detailed and extensive analysis of the medical evidence in the Kennedy 
assassination available (HSCA, Appendix to Hearings 73-198). 
Dr. Baden concluded that there was a possibility, although highly remote, that 
President Kennedy was struck in the head by a bullet fired from the Grassy Knoll. He 
stated that the medical evidence ofthis shot, however, was obliterated by another shot 
striking JFK in the head from behind a fraction of a second later. Baden maintained that 
there is no medical evidence indicating that JFK was shot from the front. He told the 
Committee during public testimony that, regarding the competency of JFK's autopsy, 
"Some people assume authority and upon others authority is thrust, as happened to Dr. 
Humes.. . A well-experienced hospital pathologist ... he had not been exposed to many 
gunshot wounds and had not performed autopsies in deaths due to shooting previously: 
neither had the other autopsy pathologists present." Although Baden's panel concluded 
that the autopsist's report did not jibe with the photographic evidence of the autopsy, both 
the autopsy and the photos indicated that President Kennedy had been shot twice, both 
times from the rear. 
Speaking for the Forensic Pathology Panel, he testified that President Kennedy had 
been struck twice from behind. Much testimony was devoted to an error Baden claimed 
the autopsy doctors had made in locating the rear point of entry on the head. They had 
placed it four inches too low, he said, perhaps because they had written the autopsy report 
based on memory (HSCA Hearings, I, 306). 
Representative Preyer asked Baden: "How do you account for that when [they] 
actually saw the body ... and [you] did not?" Replied Baden: "In general, the doctors who 
perform [an] autopsy have a better opportunity to make valid observations than those who 
come later, but in this instance, the photographs taken .. . and the· X-rays taken ... provide 
sufficient evidence for the panel members to arrive at valid ... independent conclusions" 
(HSCA Hearings, I, 300). 
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008: Dr. James J. Humes September 7, 1978 
Captain James J. Humes received an M.D. degree from Jefferson Medical College in 
1948 and completed his residency in pathology at the Armed Forces Institute ofPathology 
in 1956. He became chief of anatomic pathology at the National Naval Medical Center in 
Bethesda, MD in 1960. He became the director ofthe laboratories at the National 
Medical Center in 1961 . 
It may be helpful to delineate Dr. Humes' testimony and experience before the Warren 
Commission. All three autopsy doctors were present in the same hearing room when 
Commander Humes was questioned by the Warren Commission. The other two would, 
after swearing-in and greetings, agree to his findings. Before and after their combined 
appearance, a total of92 other individuals were each asked more questions than the three 
pathologists combined. While statistics can mislead, I find those numbers a numbing 
condemnation of the methods of the Warren Commission. 
In establishing his bona fides, Humes indicated that his experience in pathology 
included "violent deaths, accidents, suicides, and so forth" (WC Hearings, II, 348). 
When asked who else was present at the autopsy, Humes answered that he was able to 
remember Galloway, Stover, and Ebersole (none ofwhom was called before the WC). 
This selective memory (which indicated that either Humes did not know the names ofhis 
staff members, such as Jenkins, O'Connor, Custer, or Reed, or that he had no staff, or that 
he was totally unaware ofthe many people in the room that night) suggests 
incompetence. An absence ofanswer also put less demands on the Commission, as men 
like Paul O'Connor nevertheless saw a different JFK than appeared in either the autopsy 
report or the photographs. Humes was also quite low in his estimates of the number of 
photos taken (WC Hearings, II, 349). 
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Humes was asked to submit drawings prepared by a Navy medical illustrator based on 
his descriptions of JFK. Are we to believe that he could not have put his finger on a 
cadaver for the illustrator and said, 'tfere"? He added that for "absolute accuracy" the 
photos would be necessary, but since they were not made available, we must rely on his 
descriptions and bypass "absolute accuracy" (WC Hearings, II, 350). 
Arlen Specter, discussing the fragments, asked a question with a foregone conclusion: 
"Were these all fragments that were injected into the skull by the bullet?" (WC Hearings, 
II, 353 [my emphasis]) . It was Specter's way of limiting testimony to one bullet. 
Humes testified that the autopsy ended at approximately 11 pm (WC Hearings, II, 
349). He would add, "Sometime later on that evening or very early the next morning, 
while we were still engaged in continuing our examination, I was presented with three 
loose portions ofbone ... " which he went on to say roughly filled the defect in JFK' s skull 
(WC Hearings, II, 354). As we know, the bone called the 'tfarper fragment" was not 
found until the following day. That also begs the question, for ifthe autopsy ended at 11 , 
how was anything done "very early the next morning"? 
Humes was unable to describe the large skull defect except to say it was Bern (5 
inches) at one point. Specter asked how a 6.5mm bullet could make a 15 by 6mm hole, 
and Humes answered, "skin recoil" (WC Hearings, II, 356). The next question should 
have been, "Through bone?" Humes was asked if he saw the President' s clothing and he 
answered, "Yes, yesterday ... ," suggesting the rehearsal of testimony (WC Hearings, II, 
364) . When asked the angle of decline, Humes prefaced his remarks with "Mathematics is 
not my forte," and then answered, "Approximately 45 degrees from the horizontal" (WC 
Hearings, II, 370). 
Specter posited his "assume for the moment" thesis, so he could tailor any answer to 
his question, and Humes seemed slightly confused. The topic then turned to his burning of 
a preliminary draft of his report, which is at odds with the oft-told tale that he burned 
papers with JFK' s blood on them (WC Hearings, II, 370, 372-73). Did he write the 
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preliminary autopsy report on bloody paper? Not likely. 
Humes then testified that the pristine "magic bullet" did not do the damage done to 
either Governor Connally' s wrist or thigh, (WC Hearings, II, 374, 376) and the subject 
was probed no further. Humes had answered his questions and was excused. 
I could think ofmany questions to round out what the Commission avoided. Chief 
among them are why was standard autopsy procedure, in which the examination is 
verbally recorded into a suspended microphone, discarded? How could the brain weigh 
1500 grams when it had been thoroughly shot out? How could one bullet, which left 
fragments all along the top of the cranium, seriously damage the cerebral peduncles, 
located above the roof of the mouth, and leave no trace? Commander, have you seen the 
Zapruder film? Why were secrecy oaths required, if all necessary observations are in the 
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autopsy report? And why didn't you note, for the official record, the names ofyour staff? 
Humes was in a tough spot in Bethesda and I think he still knows a little more than he' s 
telling. 
The House Select Committee would not be as accommodating. They would grill him 
behind closed doors in Executive Session mercilessly. They would be somewhat gentler 
during his public testimony. 
Chief Counsel, G. Robert Blakey, announced: "It would be appropriate now, Mr. 
Chairman, to call Captain Humes." A jowly, tired-looking man stood up. Humes (one of 
the three original autopsy doctors) was now a professor of pathology at Wayne State 
University and Vice President ofMedical Affairs at St. John's Hospital in Detroit. 
Congressman Louis Stokes administered the oath. The Committee interrogator was 
Deputy Chief Counsel Gary Cornwell. 
Humes began: "I was summoned from my home late in [the] afternoon of that day by 
the Surgeon General of the Navy and the Commanding Officer ofthe Navy Medical 
School (respectively, Adm. Edward Kenney, Adm. Calvin Galloway, Capt. John 
Stover),and was told that the body of the late President was being brought to our 
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laboratories and that I was to examine the President and ascertain the cause ofdeath" 
(HSCA Hearings, I , 324). 
Then came a question about when the autopsy began. Replied Humes: "Well, the 
President's body, as I recall, arrived about 7:35, 7:40 in the evening and after some 
preliminary examinations, about 8 or 8: 15" (HSCA Hearings, I, 324). Humes told the 
Warren Commission: after "certain ... other examinations" (WC Hearings, II, 349). He 
included the same detail, just changing "certain other" to "some preliminary." 
Cornwell asked: "About what time of the night was the autopsy finally concluded?" 
Replied Humes: "Oh, I would estimate around midnight" (HSCA Hearings, I, 324). 
Cornwell proceeded to say that, as Humes knew, the panel had reviewed his autopsy 
report, had spoken with him "on one prior occasion," and that there was " ... one possible 
major area ofdisagreement, and that is with respect to the location ofa bullet wound in 
the back ofthe President's head ... " (HSCA Hearings, I, 324-25). 
Cornwell asked if it wasn't the case that there was "one and only one bullet wound to 
the back ofthe President's head, that it did enter in the rear, exited the front. Is that report 
accurate on those three points, to the best ofyour knowledge?" 
"Absolutely," replied Humes (HSCA Hearings, I, 325). 
Cornwell showed Humes the Ida Dox drawing which was the exact replica ofan 
autopsy photograph ofthe back ofthe head (there were four such photographs -- two 
black and white, numbered 17 and 18, and two in color, numbered 42 and 43). Cornwell 
edged into the controversy. "Our panel of forensic pathologists, of course, were not 
present during the autopsy, did not have access to the body, and, therefore, you and your 
colleagues who were there are in a unique position to provide testimony as to the nature 
of the wounds .. .. " Cornwell then noted that Humes had been examined once before by the 
House Select Committee, and picked out a spot at the bottom of the back of the head as 
the entrance wound. Cornwell read one excerpt after another from the transcript to 
indicate that Humes had steadfastly maintained that what Cornwell referred to as a "small 
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droplet" at the bottom of the picture was the wound of entry. 
Cornwell went through the same points Dr. Petty had enumerated in the closed session 
which would indicate that the lower position was the artifact, the upper position was the 
wound: the focus ofthe pictures, the way the ruler was held, etc. 
The time had come for Humes to make a public retraction. 
Cornwell asked Humes ifhe had had "a greater opportunity" to review the 
photographs "and if, after doing so, you have a more well-considered or a different 
opinion or whether your opinion is still the same; as to where the point ofentry is?" 
"Yes, I think that I do have a different opinion," replied Humes, but he said he had 
several comments to make before answering the question: "I go back further to the 
original autopsy report which we rendered, in the absence ofany photographs ofcourse. 
We made certain physical obseIVations and measurements ofthese wounds. I state now 
those measurements we recorded then were accurate to the best of our ability to discern 
what we had before our eyes" (HSCA Hearings, I, 327). 
Now Humes returned to the Ida Dox drawing and the X-ray. And he didn't retract. 
He did concede that the bullet wound was at the upper location -- not the lower location -
- but he then maintained that the upper location was the location he described in the 
autopsy report. "We described the wound ofentrance in the posterior scalp as being above 
and to the right ofthe external occipital protuberance," said Humes (the autopsy report 
said the wound was located "2.5cm laterally to the right and slightly above the external 
occipital protuberance). "And it is obvious to me as I sit here ... that the upper defect to 
which you pointed, or the upper object is clearly in the location ofwhere we said 
approximately where it was ... therefore, I believe that is the wound of entry" (HSCA 
Hearings, I, 327). 
Humes then said that he attributed its apparently higher location to underlying skull 
fractures and the positioning of the head for the photo, "making some distortion of 
anatomic structures to produce this picture" (HSCA Hearings, I, 327). 
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He said the lower item which he had previously identified he had identified 
"erroneously" and "would not fit with the original autopsy findings" (HSCA Hearings, I, 
327). 
But it was the X-ray which was the source of measurement -- four inches above the 
external occipital protuberance. Humes was now asked to step up to the enlargement of 
the X-ray and identify the wound. "This he did, commenting that it was a 'pleasure' to 
have such materials. "I didn't have anything of this kind formerly,'' (HSCA Hearings, I, 
328) he said. Cornwell asked Humes to describe in words the spot to which he was 
pointing. 
Humes did not back down. "Well, in this approximate area would be about where the · 
external occipital protuberance would be, the knob we can feel in the back of our head. 
This would be above it. " By way of explanation he added: "There is a great enlargement 
here, so it looks considerably further away than it would be on a standard size film or on 
the skull ...." ( HSCA Hearings, I, 328-29). 
"IfI might add, and more importantly, I had the opportunity, which none of the 
gentlemen had to do, to examine the President's skull from the inside when the brain was 
removed, with great care. There was one, and only one, wound of entrance" (HSCA 
Hearings, I, 329). Humes said its exact location had embroiled them in "somewhat of a 
semantic discussion" (HSCA Hearings, I, 329). 
The X-ray of the head seemed to show large skull fragments . Commenting on them, 
he made a curious remark: " ...this bullet was so disruptive, those fragments I think could 
virtually be any place" (HSCA Hearings, I, 329). It was a strange remark considering that 
"those fragments" comprised most of the skullcap. 
Cornwell then came to the fundamental question -- that the panel had measured the 
wound on the X-ray and that they placed it at "approximately 10 centimeters above [the] 
external occipital protuberance. Would that discrepancy be explainable?" 
Humes balked: "Well, I have a little trouble with that; 10 centimeters is a significant --
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4 inches." Humes then added: "I go back to the fact there was only one, period" (HSCA 
Hearings, I, 329). 
That night the newspapers headlined that the autopsy doctor had admitted that he 
made a four-inch error. But did he admit that? I don't think so. Humes stubbornly 
maintained that the wound depicted in the evidence was the one he described that night, 
suggesting that the enlargement on the X-ray might make it appear higher, and specifically 
stating, when confronted with the 1 OOmrn measurement: "I have a little trouble with 
that ... . " 
The rest ofHumes' testimony was over in a few minutes. Humes told how he had 
called Dallas and learned about the throat wound, how it was decided that a committee of 
three couldn't write the report, "so I assumed the responsibility," and that he had burned 
the notes because they were bloodstained (HSCA Hearings, I, 330). 
One interchange arrested my attention. This testimony seemed significant because of 
the possibility that a reconstruction was photographed and subsequently used as evidence. 
Humes said he stayed in the morgue to assist the morticians: 
CORNWELL: During that period, were there efforts made to reconstruct the 
President' s head? 
HUMES: Yes, indeed. 
CORNWELL: Would it be accurate to state that those efforts entailed handling ofthe 
head over a long period of time? 
HUMES: Very accurate (HSCA Hearings, I, 331). 
Chairman Stokes asked Humes ifhe had anything to say; he was allowed five minutes 
to make a statement. Humes said he was "quite elated" that the findings of all the panels 
that had examined the autopsy X-rays and photographs "in such great detail, are in basic 
accordance with what we originally ascertained to be the situation. We are pleased by 
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that. 
"Our testimony before the Warren Commission is quite lengthy, as I am sure some of 
the Committee members are aware. However, I feel it also was hampered by our 
inability ... to never have seen, after about midnight of that night, the X-rays, to never have 
seen at any time until a year or two after the Warren Commission the photographs which 
we made" (HSCA Hearings, I, 310) 
He closed by saying: "I will be pleased to answer any other questions from you, sir, or 
any other members of the Committee" (HSCA Hearings, I, 310). 
But there were no other questions. 
The committee had tried to impeach his testimony, which stood in the way of their 
analysis. He should have had legal representation. 
009: Dr. Cyril H. Wecht September 7, 1978 
One of the Forensic Pathology's panel members, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 
coroner and former President of the American Academy ofForensic Sciences, Dr. Cyril 
Wecht, vigorously dissented that all shots came from the rear. He asserted that the single-
bullet theory was medically impossible and that the evidence did not rule out the 
possibility of a shot being fired from the right front and striking the president in the head. 
The eight other panel members, however, disagreed, and the House Select Committee 
properly accepted their findings as representing the consensus of medical expertise 
(HSCA, Appendix to Hearings 199-210; HSCA Hearings, I, 332-73). 
As a member of the forensic pathology panel, which frequently voted 8-1 on matters 
regarding the numbers and direction of the bullets fired in Dealey Plaza, Wecht often 
found himself as the lone dissenter. 
He had previously testified before the Rockefeller Commission on the assassination, 
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accusing that Commission of"deliberately distorting and suppressing" part ofhis 
testimony. Wecht is regarded by many as the nation' s leading expert on forensic 
pathology. 
Mr. Purdy asked: ''Dr. Wecht, is it your opinion that no bullet could have caused all of 
the wounds to President Kennedy and Governor Connally or that Commission Exhibit 399 
(the pristine bullet) could not have caused all of the wounds to both men?" (HSCA 
Hearings, I, 333). 
" . .. it is my opinion that no bullet could have caused all these wounds, not only 3 99, 
but no other bullet that we know about or any fragment of any bullet that we know about 
in this case." 
Dr. Wecht went on to say: "I have raised some questions concerning the head wound 
and the possibility ... of a second shot fired in synchronized fashion from the right side or 
the lower right rear, synchronized with the head shot that struck the President in the back 
of the head" (HSCA Hearings, I, 333). Dr. Wecht then went on to complain that they 
needed the brain to properly examine the evidence, but that long ago he had discovered it 
was missing from the National Archives (HSCA Hearings, I, 333). 
He then said that certain tests should have been performed. "Why our panel of 
distinguished experts with all our expertise and this staff representing a very prominent 
committee which, in tum, represents the House ofRepresentatives of the United States 
Congress, why such tests could not be performed is beyond me. I feel constrained to say 
that they were not performed because people knew full well what the results would 
be . .. we are talking about what the condition of the bullet would be if it went through 
these bones" (HSCA Hearings, I, 337). 
He was then asked: ''Dr. Wecht, is it your opinion, then, that not only is the conclusion 
of the forensic panel that Commission Exhibit 399 (the pristine bullet which went through 
all those bones and made all those wounds in President Kennedy and John Connally) is 
consistent with the wounds, incorrect, you feel it is demonstrably false, is that correct?" 
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(HSCA Hearings, I, 337). 
Wecht replied: "It is absolutely false ... I have repeatedly, limited to the context of the 
forensic pathologist, numerous times implored, beseeched, urged, in writing, orally, 
privately, collectively, my colleagues; to come up with one bullet, that has done this. I am 
not talking about 50 percent of the time plus one, 5 percent or 1 percent - just one bullet 
that has done this ... At no time did any of my colleagues ever bring in a bullet from a 
documented case ... it broke two bones in some human being, and look at it, its condition, 
it is pristine. 
" I stand here today and I wonder where that bullet is? Maybe it will be presented by 
the next member of the majority who has conveniently been sandwiched on the other side 
of me sometime tomorrow." 
It is important to note that in the end, the Committee stayed with the "magic bullet 
theory," saying that only one bullet hit both men at the same time, but found that there 
was indeed a fourth shot, which they said missed, as did the first or second shot. The new 
shot was, they admitted, fired from the grassy knoll . 
010: Dr. Charles S. Petty September 8, 1978 
Dr. Charles Petty received an M .D . degree, cum laude, from Harvard Medical School 
in 1950 and completed his residency in pathology in 1955 at the New England Deaconess 
Hospital in Boston, MA. He is certified in the areas of pathological anatomy, clinical 
pathology, and forensic pathology by the American Board ofPathology. He is a fellow of 
the American Academy of Forensic Science, the American Association of Pathologists, the 
American Society of Clinical Pathologists and the College of American Pathologists. 
Dr. Charles Petty ' s testimony was either devoted to debunking the single bullet theory 
proposed by Dr. Cyril Wecht, or he was merely grouped categorically and anyone who 
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followed Dr. Wecht would have been an advocate of the magic bullet theory, as Wecht 
was the lone dissenter on the medical panel. Dr. Petty was only asked eleven questions, 
but in the course of his answers made statements that are controversial to this day. 
If President Kennedy' s back wound was a deeply penetrated wound, it had to travel 
downward, at least initially, unless Kennedy was shot by someone in the trunk of the car. 
To maintain the single-bullet theory, however, it would have had to go upward, as the 
entrance was lower than the exit . On the other hand, with the car going down an incline, 
and Kennedy leaning forward, the idea is that the bullet went downward relative to 
Dealey Plaza, and upward relative to the upright plane of JFK' s body. 
Dr. Petty went on to answer Mr. Preyer about what the bullet did after it entered 
President Kennedy' s back. He said it "did not go through the spinal column" (HSCA 
Hearings, I, 377). There seem to be two schools of thought on this. John K. Lattimer, in 
his book Kennedy and Lincoln -- Medical and Ballistic Comparisons of Their 
Assassinations, shows one of JFK's x-rays that indicate a nick in the spinal column. 
Others seem to interpret the x-rays as originally showing bullet fragments, then bone 
fragments, then apparently found to be artifacts similar to those on other x-rays that night . 
Still others, have thought that the bullet hit no bone and that if there was damage to a 
bone, it likely resulted from pressure effects of the passing bullet; in other words, 
secondary damage. 
Dr. Petty said that "one cannot determine by looking at a flat two dimensional view of 
one side of the limousine and the contained individuals precisely what relationship they 
[Kennedy and Connally] had one to another" (HSCA Hearings, I, 377) . This is important 
in determining their relationship on not only a horizontal plane, but a vertical one as well . 
This is vital when discussing the single-bullet theory. The more fundamental reason for 
not being able to determine their relationship is that we do not know for sure, or even 
remotely close (to a certainty), when President Kennedy was first hit from the rear; this 
seems to be the crux of the problem. There was a time, as we know, when they were 
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obscured because of the Stemmons Freeway sign. Preceeding that, it is very hard to make 
sense of absolute positions. They are not, however, flat. Stereo viewing is easy to do, 
and someone who knows how to properly feed the data into a computer can get accurate 
three-dimensional information which can be studied from any angle. We also have more 
than one film/photo to work from for various points. 
Petty went on to say that there "is no evidence that that bullet actually penetrated the 
rib" [of Governor Connally] (HSCA Hearings, I, 377). That rib, however, was badly 
shattered, not "slapped." It turned a human rib into a bunch ofmatch heads. This seems a 
little odd ifthe bullet merely slapped against it as Petty suggests. I know ofno other 
doctor who has ever postulated this theory. The only other possibility is that this may 
have been secondary damage with no actual contact. 
"The X-rays fail to show any evidence of particles ofmetal in the chest'' (HSCA 
Hearings, I, 378). This may well be true. What is known is that metal was left in 
Governor Connally. That was never in doubt. The surgeons report indicated that they 
had fixed the chest wound and were getting ready to go back to the other wounds and 
remove the bullet. 
When Mr. Preyer asked Dr. Petty if "it was accurate to say that the bullet went 
through the wrist bone" [of Governor Connally], Dr. Petty replied: '1 don't believe it did" 
(HSCA Hearings, I, 380). This seems very odd, because when you look at the X-ray, the 
bone was literally sliced in half on an angle. It would be like saying the football didn't hit 
the window, yet the glass broke into a hundred pieces and landed eight feet away from 
where it was - this X-ray has been published and seems to demonstrate this. 
In respect to frangible bullets, Dr. Petty stated that they are produced in 22 caliber 
loads and not produced in larger weapons. Hand loading makes a variety of variations 
possible. He is talking strictly about what is available off the shelf, which is a mistake. 
He went on to say that if Kennedy had been hit on the right side of the head, then the left 
side of his brain would show such evidence. According to Petty, "There are no such 
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fragments" (HSCA Hearings, I, 379). The head X-ray ofPresident Kennedy, however, 
would support a frangible bullet, as there was a halo-like spray of40-50 fragments 
throughout the remaining cortext area. This would account for a portion ofa bullet -
where is the rest? The question is: If the magic bullet could do all it did and come out 
undamaged, how did the same type ofbullet go all to pieces? 
Finally, Dr. Petty states that "there is no evidence whatsoever that the President was 
shot either from the side or from the front" (HSCA Hearings, I, 380). The testimony he 
has given would support such a view. 
011: Larry Sturdivan September 8, 1978 
Larry Sturdivan had degrees in statistics and physics from the University ofDelaware 
and Oklahoma State University. He had studied mathematics and computer sciences at 
the Ballistics Institute ofthe Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 
MD. He had also been a physical scientist with the Wounds Ballistic Branch ofthe 
Aberdeen Proving Ground Vulnerability Laboratory since 1964. He was also a frequent 
consultant in wound ballistics for such agencies as the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration and the Department ofJustice as well as NATO. 
The pathologists came to the same determination that the Warren Commission reached, 
that President Kennedy had been struck by only two bullets: one to the upper right side of 
the back that exited the throat and one that struck him high on the back ofhis head. 
Strongly reinforcing the pathologists' conclusions was the testimony of wounds 
ballistics expert Larry Sturdivan. In testimony before the committee, Sturdivan stated 
that, in his opinion, the Zapruder film, the autopsy material, and the ballistics evidence all 
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substantiated the Warren Commission's finding that all shots were fired from Oswald's 
rifle_ Sturdivan also showed the committee a film of goats being shot to explain the 
apparent discrepancy between Kennedy's backward head movement and a shot's entering 
the rear of his head. Sturdivan asserted that the reason for Kennedy's backward head 
movement was a neuromuscular reaction to the massive destruction of neurological tissue 
that the bullet caused (HSCA Hearings, I, 383-427). 
Sturdivan testified that the reason Bullet 399 broke the governor's rib and wrist bones 
without suffering deformity was that the missile had lost substantial velocity by first going 
through President Kennedy's neck. Since there is no evidence whatsoever that Bullet 399 
wounded either man, Sturdivan's statement was meaningless. Also, tests conducted for 
the Warren Commission in 1964 revealed that bullets from Oswald's rifle into such 
diverse substances as a goat's ribs, a cadaver's wrist, a gelatin compound, and cotton 
invariably suffered damage and mutilation that sharply distinguished them from the 
virtually intact Bullet 399 (HSCA Hearings, I, 393-401). 
Sturdivan also stated that Kennedy was not struck in the front of the head by an 
exploding bullet fired from the Grassy Knoll. The reason, Sturdivan declared, was that the 
computer-enhanced X-rays ofKennedy's skull do not depict "a cloud ofmetallic fragments 
very near the entrance wound." In cases where exploding bullets impact, he asserted that 
"you would definitely have seen" such a cloud of fragments in the X-ray. Sturdivan's 
remarks betrayed both his own ignorance of the medical evidence and the committee's 
careful manipulation of that evidence. Sturdivan saw only the computer-enhanced X-ray 
of the skull, not the original, unretouched X-rays. Had he seen the originals, he would 
have observed a cloud ofmetallic fragments clustered in the right front portion of the 
head. Furthermore, the closeup photograph of the margins of the large wound in the head 
shows numerous small fragments . The Forensic Pathology Panel itself noted the presence 
of "missile dust" near the wound in the front of the head. One of the expert radiologists 
who examined the X-rays noticed "linear alignment of tiny metallic fragments" located in 
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the "posterior aspect of the right frontal bone." The chief autopsy pathologist, Dr. James 
J. Humes, remarked about the numerous metallic fragments like grains of sand scattered 
near the front head wound. The medical evidence, then, definitely proves the existence of 
a cloud of fragments in the right front portion ofKennedy's head, convincing evidence, 
according to Sturdivan, that an exploding bullet actually did strike the president there 
(HSCA Hearings, I, 40l ;Appendix to HSCA Hearings, VII, 131 , 119; WC Report, 543). 
Sturdivan's final observation was that the backward movement ofPresident Kennedy's 
head was not due to the impact of a bullet fired from the front, but from a neuromuscular 
reaction caused by massive destruction of his central nervous system. To substantiate this, 
Sturdivan told the committee that jackrabbits shot in the head automatically spring upward 
because they experience a similar neuromuscular reaction resulting in the release of 
tension in their leg muscles. Then Sturdivan showed the committee a film ofa goat, its 
horns taped to a bar, shot between the eyes. Its response to the fatal shot was an arching 
of the back and a stiffening of the legs. According to Sturdivan, Kennedy's backward 
movement was identical to the animal's (HSCA Hearings, I, 415-17). 
That the committee should accept such material as Sturdivan's demonstration as 
"scientific evidence" furnishes an outstanding example ofits lack of objectivity. To the 
disinterested observer, it is obvious that President Kennedy was neither a jackrabbit or a 
goat, that he neither sprang upward nor arched his back and straightened his legs after _ 
being shot, and that he was not shot between the eyes. The utter irrelevance of the animal 
films to the Kennedy assassination requires no further demonstration. Yet the committee 
accepted them as proof that President Kennedy was not shot from the front. For 
example, committee member Harold Sawyer wrote that the film "of the goat shooting 
episodes convincingly explained the rearward reaction of the President's head as seen in 
the Zapruder film and very convincingly demonstrates that it could not have been caused 
by the frontal impact of a bullet" (HSCA Report, 509). 
Had the committee exhibited interest in discovering the true explanation of the 
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backward movement of Kennedy's head, it would have studied the evidence about human, 
rather than animal, response to bullet wounds. The committee, in fact, already possessed 
one instance provided in its investigation of the assassination ofDr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. (whose assassination they were also investigating simultaneously). As Dr. King leaned 
forward on the balcony outside his motel room, a bullet fired from the front struck him in 
the jaw, tore through his mouth, and exploded into his neck. According to Sturdivan's 
analysis, this front-entering bullet should have propelled Dr. King forward off the balcony 
onto the ground below. Instead, the bullet knocked Dr. King violently backward, causing 
him to fall on his back on the balcony floor. Countless other examples, including films of 
soldiers shot in the head, verify without exception the fact that bullets striking people in 
the head cause the head to move in the direction of the path of the bullet (HSCA Report, 
290-91 ; BBC-TV, The World at War, "The Battle of Stalingrad," shows several scenes of 
soldiers shot in the head). 
12: Monty C. Lutz September 8, 1978 (w/Champagne, Bates, Newquist) 
Monty Lutz held a B.S. degree in criminal justice from the University ofNebraska and 
was the Wisconsin Regional Crime Laboratory firearms examiner. 
Mr. Lutz was a member of the ballistics panel for the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations. He was a Wisconsin Regional Crime Laboratory firearms examiner. His 
particular panel concluded that President Kennedy was shot twice, both times from above 
and to the rear. Lutz asserted that the bullet's fragmentation was not inconsistent with a 
Carcano round. Nothing else was added to the record by Mr. Lutz during his portion of 
the testimony. 
013: Donald E. Champagne September 8, 1978 (w/Lutz, Bates, Newquist) 
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Donald Champagne was a firearms and tool mark examiner with the Florida 
Department of Criminal Law Enforcement in Tallahassee. He had previously served for 
15 years as a firearms and tool mark examiner in the Crime Detection Laboratory in 
Ottawa, Ontario. 
Also part of the ballistics panel for the House Committee on Assassinations, Mr. 
Champagne was a member of the Florida Department ofLaw Enforcement. Champagne 
agreed with Lutz about the bullet's fragmentation . He claimed that you can't go by what 
you've seen before, because there is no way of predicting what is going to happen to a 
bullet. Further, he would state that you can't say a particular type ofbullet is going to do 
certain things, because once that bullet leaves the muzzle of the weapon, you have no idea 
what is going to happen with any bullet. He offered the peculiar explanation that the 
6.5mm Carcano is a nominal caliber, which doesn't necessarily mean that is the caliber of 
the bullet. 
014: John S. Bates, Jr. September 8, 1978 (w/Lutz, Champagne, Newquist) 
John Bates was the senior firearms examiner in the New York State Police laboratory 
at Albany .. He had been a lecturer at the State University ofNew York at Albany, the 
New York Police Academy and the New York State Municipal Police Training Council. 
Mr. Bates was the senior firearms examiner for the New York State Police Academy. 
He also was a member of the ballistics panel for the House Committee on Assassinations. 
He asserted that the bullet that hit President Kennedy in the head would have broken up in 
a manner that it did upon impact with Kennedy' s skull . Nothing else was added to the 
record by Mr. Bates. 
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015: Andrew M. Newquist September 8, 1978 (w/Lutz, Champagne, Bates) 
Andrew Newquist was a special agent and firearm, tool mark and latent fingerprint 
examiner for the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation. He was a member and past 
president of the Association of Firearm and Tool Examiners, and was currently on its 
executive committee. 
Mr. Newquist was a member ofthe ballistics panel for the House Committee on 
Assassinations. He stated that the panel was not able to reach a conclusion as to what rifle 
fired CE-573, or the Walker bullet. It was believed by the Warren Commission that Lee 
Harvey Oswald fired a shot at retired General Edwin Walker in April of 1963. This of 
course was used by the Commission to help establish the violent side ofLee Harvey 
Oswald. 
The Dallas Police Department claimed the shell was either a .30-.30 or .3006, which of 
course Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano was not. The only witness who saw anyone leave 
the scene after the shot, a teenage neighbor, reported two men getting into the car. On 
the other side is the often-cited note by Oswald to Marina, and her testimony. She also 
testified that he planned to shoot Nixon at a time when Nixon hadn't visited Dallas. It 
doesn't seem convincing either way whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald fired at General 
Edwin Walker. 
016:Dr. Vincent P. Guinn September 8, 1978 
A chemistry professor at the University ofCalifornia at Irvine, Dr. Guinn presented 
hard scientific evidence to substantiate his claims. He was also head ofthe activation 
analysis program of the general atomic division of General Dynamics Corporation. He 
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subjected various bullet fragments to neutron activation analysis, a process whereby 
objects are irradiated with nuclear radiation and the different levels of radiation according 
to their weight is measured; the precise chemical composition of a substance can be 
measured in units as tiny as parts per billion. In the field ofballistics, neutron activation 
analysis has proven a valuable instrument for identifying bullets and bullet fragments 
(Wahl and Kramer 68-86). 
The three pieces of ammunition which linked the rifle to the assassination were found 
outside anyone's body - bullet 399 on the stretcher, and Commission Exhibits 567 and 
569, the two large fragments found in the car on Friday night, November 22, at the White 
House garage. 
But also in evidence were pieces of metal too tiny to be compared under the ballistic 
microscope, pieces allegedly found inside the bodies of the victims. They were Warren 
Commission Exhibit 843 , two metal fragments removed from the brain (and the only metal 
removed from Kennedy's body at the autopsy), and Warren Commission Exhibit 842, the 
fragments removed from Connally' s wrist . 
The fragments were too small for ballistics tests, and the FBI, within twenty-four hours 
of the shooting, had done the routine spectrographic examination. Flame spectrography 
was used: a destructive test in which a tiny sample is burned and the color of the flame 
compared with known standards to reveal chemical composition. The results reported on 
November 23 , 1963 were inconclusive. All the FBI could report was that the lead in the 
different samples was "similar,'' (WC Hearings, 24, 263) which is something like saying 
the "2" in "102" is similar to the "2" in "42" - not very enlightening. Several months 
later, at the request of the Warren Commission, the FBI attempted neutron activation 
analysis: a non-destructive test in which two samples to be compared are bombarded by 
neutrons and their radioactive characteristics compared. That can reveal what trace 
elements - minor impurities - exist, and in what concentrations; and that, in turn, permits 
a conclusion about the probability of common origin. 
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The FBI found the results inconclusive. It was not possible to tell, said their expert, 
from which of the larger bullets any of the smaller fragments might have come. 
The critics of the Warren Commission were suspicious because the existence of those 
tests was not revealed until the 1970s, and the actual data themselves - FBI Laboratory 
worksheets - were not released until 1975, after a series oflawsuits under the Freedom of 
Information Act. 
The critics believed that if the work was done properly it would immediately become 
apparent that Warren Commission Exhibits 399 and 842 (the metal from Connally's wrist) 
were different, and that would disprove the single-bullet theory. 
Vincent Guinn was hired to do such tests. The Archives sent a courier to his 
laboratory at UC, Irvine, where he had a nuclear reactor. Guinn made measurements of 
the lead and antimony content ofthe bullets and found that 399 and the metal in the 
sample box labeled "CE 842" were statistically indistinguishable - which, in the language 
of the chemist, meant that they were identical (HSCA Hearings, I, 504, 554-55). 
With respect to the other fragments in evidence, there was also a problem. In 1969, 
the Secret Service sent documents to the National Archives that hadn' t been released to 
the Warren Commission. One was an FBI receipt for "a missile removed . .. by Commander 
James J. Humes . .. on this date." The receipt, dated November 22, 1963, was issued to 
Capt. John Stover, Humes superior, and signed by FBI agents Sibert and O'Neill ((NA, 
RG 272, E-52, item I ©). 
Guinn testified his tests showed that the brain fragments came from one of the two 
missiles found in the car, and that Commission Exhibit 842 came from the bottom ofbullet 
399, where some lead was missing (HSCA Hearings, I, 555). 
Guinn talked about another matter bearing on the legitimacy of the fragments in the 
sample boxes. He told how he opened one box - Q-15, supposedly metal from the 
windshield - to find it completely empty. "What did you do?" he was asked. He said that 
he carefully examined the interior of the sample box with a magnifying glass, but nothing 
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was there. 
Guinn' s work played a major role in convincing the Committee that bullet 399 had 
struck Connally' s wrist - hence, that Kennedy and Connally were struck by the same 
bullet. 
In the Kennedy assassination case, neutron activation analysis could be used to 
determine whether Bullet 399, bullet fragments removed from the president's brain and 
from the governor's wrist, and the limousine fragments came from the same ammunition 
and if that ammunition matched Oswald's rifle. In September 1977, Dr. Guinn had tested 
these materials and surmised that the fragments from the governor's wrist came from 
Bullet 399, a powerful and convincing scientific substantiation of the single-bullet theory. 
Guinn also found that the fragments removed from President Kennedy's brain matched 
the fragments found in the limousine, proof that only one bullet, fired from Oswald's rifle, 
struck the president in the head. Dr. Guinn reported that neutron activation analysis 
revealed evidence ofonly two bullets, both Mannlicher-Carcanos of the exact type used in 
Oswald's rifle. Dr. Guinn's analysis, therefore, fully supported the medical evidence and 
the Warren Commission's findings that all bullets striking the president and the governor 
were fired from Oswald's rifle (HSCA Hearings, I, 490-567). 
On the surface, the neutron activation analysis tests performed by Dr. Guinn provided 
strong support both for the single-bullet theory and for the contention that the fatal head 
shot was fired from Lee Harvey Oswald's rifle. Since the wrist fragments and Bullet 399 
matched each other, the committee accepted Dr. Guinn's thesis that they came from the 
same bullet. Likewise, the committee endorsed the Guinn theory that the head and 
limousine fragments came from the same bullet (HSCA Hearings, I, 538). 
A more careful analysis of the neutron activation analysis tests, however, shows 
numerous deficiencies that contest all ofDr. Guinn's central conclusions. First, of the 
more than thirty bullet fragments in John Kennedy's head, only two were subjected to the 
test. The rest remained embedded in brain tissue and skull bone. That two head 
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fragments matched each other does not mean that the others did so. Second, Dr. Guinn 
did not analyze the large copper fragment found in the limousine. The origin of that 
fragment, therefore, remains scientifically unproved. Third, Dr. Guinn had previously 
performed neutron activation analysis on Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition, one of the 
bullets being from the same manufacture and production lot (Western Cartridge Company, 
lot 6003) as bullets from Oswald's rifle. None of the bullets matched each other. 
Moreover, Guinn analyzed pieces of the same bullet, and they, too, failed to match. For 
example, the four pieces of the bullet from lot 6003 had figures ranging from 7. 9 to 15 . 9 
parts per million (ppm.) silver, from 80 to 732 ppm. antimony, and from 17 to 62 ppm. 
copper. Dr. Guinn himself admitted that "some Mannlicher-Carcano bullets cannot be 
distinguished from each other" (HSCA Hearings, I, 547-49). 
Dr. Guinn performed neutron activation analysis on the "Magic bullet" (WCE 399) and 
bullet fragments reportedly taken from Governor Connally's wrist. He stated that his tests, 
"established that it was highly likely that the injuries to the Governor's wrist were caused 
by the bullet found on the stretcher at Parkland Hospital." 
The most serious shortcoming in Dr. Guinn's analysis is his failure properly to 
interpret that data from the assassination fragments. For example, the Connally wrist 
fragment contained 25 percent more silver and 850 percent more copper than Bullet 399. 
It also contained 2400 percent more sodium and 1100 percent more chlorine, and it 
contained 8.1 ppm. aluminum, while Bullet 399 contained none. Similarly, the Kennedy 
head fragment and limousine fragments contained wide disparities in their chemical 
composition. Guinn and the committee, therefore, were hardly justified in their 
conclusions about "matches. 11 Since different parts of the same bullet show different 
chemical values, and since the actual assassination fragments tested differed sharply in 
their values, the neutron activation analysis hardly lent scientific weight to the single-bullet 
and lone-assassin theories (HSC"A Hearings, I, 538). 
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017: William Hartmann September 11, 1978 
Dr. William Hartmann had a Ph.D. in astronomy from the University of Arizona. He 
had been assistant professor at the University Arizona Lunar and Planetary Laboratory, 
associate and senior scientist at the IIT Research Institute. He served as photo analyst for 
the Air Force University of Colorado study ofUFO' s and served as photo analyst and 
coinvestigator on the Mariner 9 mission to photograph Mars. 
Dr. Hartmann was part of the photopanel that conducted photographic analysis to 
determine if there was any measurable reaction on the part of the photographers who were 
taking pictures of the assassination in Dealey Plaza which might be associated with the 
sound ofgunfire (HSCA Hearings, II, 4). 
Hartmann measured the amount of blur or smearing of the image in each of the 
Zapruder frames, one frame at a time. It was a measure of the blur internally, a measure 
of the blur while the shutter was open. He noticed that there were two series of frames 
that showed a considerable amount of blur. The first , frames 188 to 191 , shows a blurring 
(or jiggling) that is more pronounced than normal blurring due to amateur experience with 
a camera. In fact, frame 191 is one of the more blurred frames in the sequence (HSCA 
Hearings, II, 8). 
There is also a heavy blur reaction around frames 313 to 319. These are the two 
places (approximately) on the Zapruder film where everyone, critic and official version 
alike, agree that President Kennedy is reacting to gunfire. He restates the Warren 
Commission version of shot sequence, which said that the first shot could not have been 
fired before frame 210, due to the blockage by a Texas live oak tree. The only opening 
would have been for one frame, approximately Z-186, where there was an opening that 
lasted for about one-eighteenth of a second. The Warren Commission didn't feel this was 
enough time for a shot to have been fired . Dr. Hartmann believes there may have been 
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enough of an opening to get a shot off due to the Jack of foliage on the tree on November 
22, 1963 (HSCA Hearings, II, 136). He also believes the testimony of Phil Willis, who 
was also taking pictures that day. Mr. Willis says he pressed the shutter as part of his 
reaction to a shot, which would correspond to Z-202. This means that a shot could 
conceivably have been fired a little earlier, which would justify the findings ofDr. 
Hartmann and tend to negate the findings of the Warren Commission. 
In order for the findings of Dr. Hartmann to work, you have to believe that someone 
fired at frame 186 of the Zapruder film. The acoustical analysis and Dr. Hartmann alike, 
assume that the shot had to come from the Texas School Book Depository, and not from 
one of the other buildings to the rear of the motorcade. 
When asked by Mr. Dodd if he was suggesting, not that a trigger was pulled, but that 
something caused Mr. Zapruder at that point to wiggle the camera (HSCA Hearings, II, 
133), Dr. Hartmann responded by saying: "I think we can say that the trigger was pulled, 
because we see in frame 313 the matter ejected from the head, the head explosion. And in 
314 it is flying on up. So if we run it backward-314,313 ,312-the bullet is hitting the 
head . And then we have to allow about two frames flight time for the bullet. On that 
basis I say that the trigger was pulled, a trigger was pulled at 310 plus or minus one. So I 
would say there must be some sound source starting at 310 plus or minus one" (HSCA 
Hearings, II, 133). 
Dr. Hartmann's blur analysis seems to verify the two obvious places on the Zapruder 
film where President Kennedy is receiving gunfire: Z-190-200 and Z-313-319. He is not 
saying more gunfire did not occur, only that the famed Zapruder film, through his blur 
analysis, seems to justify at least two rounds ofgunfire. 
Jiggle analysis, or blur analysis, is a useful tool, but doesn't in itself provide answers, 
only indications of responses by the person holding the camera. It doesn 't tell us what 
they were responding to; that is where we have to look at all of the evidence in context, as 
the whole can tell us much more than its individual parts. We might already have more 
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than enough data to solve the case, and just not be analyzing it fully or comprehensively. 
018: Dr. James E. Barger September 11, 1978, December 29, 1978 
The House Select Committee hired Bolt, Beranek, and Newman (BBN) of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, a firm specializing in scientific acoustical analysis to examine the Dallas 
Police tape dictabelt. BBN had pioneered the analysis of sound recordings to determine 
the timing and direction of gunfire through its study of a tape recording of the 1970 Kent 
State shootings (HSCA Report, 66-67). 
Dr. James E. Barger, BBNs chief scientist, conducted a series of tests. First, he 
determined that the reel-to-reel tape was an exact duplicate of the original dictabelt. Then 
he converted the tape recording to digitized waveforms, similar to the peaks and valleys of 
an electrocardiogram. Then, Barger filtered out such noise as the repeated firings of a 
motorcycle engine. Then, he selected six sequences of impulses that might possibly 
represent gunshots. Finally, Barger established that all six impulse sequences occurred 
during the time of the assassination at intervals of 1.65, 7.56, and 8.31 seconds after the 
first (the central dispatcher's office recorded the precise time that every message received 
came in). The House Committee would eventually admit to four of the six impulses 
(Appendix to HSCA Hearings, VIII, 223-388). 
Barger's initial analysis established a distinct possibility that the tape contained the 
sounds of gunshots. Now it was necessary to record the sounds of gunfire in Dealey Plaza 
in order to compare them with the impulses on the tape. In August 1978, BBN recorded 
the sounds of shots fired from the sixth-floor window of the Texas School Book 
Depository building and from the grassy knoll . Barger discovered that four of the 
impulses on the Dallas police tape matched the recorded sounds of gunfire in the 
reconstruction. Because the matches were not exact, Barger concluded that there was a 
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95 percent probability that two shots were fired from the building, a 75 percent likelihood 
that three shots came from the building, but only a 50 percent chance that a shot was fired 
from the grassy knoll (Appendix to HSCA Hearings, VIII, 47-48). 
Remember, it was Barger who testified about the most striking new development in the 
House Committee's investigation. As a result of the efforts ofa group ofDallas 
researchers, the Committee learned of the existence of a tape recording ofDallas Police 
radio transmissions, and the researcher's analysis that it contained the sound of the shots. 
The Committee now had audio evidence that a shot came from the front, but medical 
evidence that the shots came from the rear. The Committee was going to conclude that 
the President was shot by Oswald, but that another shooter had fired and missed. 
The Committee may have been wrong to rely on its acoustics conclusion so heavily. 
Dissenting expert opinion was bound to come, and soon. 
The serious blow to the acoustical evidence came in a 1982 report by the National 
Academy of Sciences. A panel ofdistinguished scientists concluded that the Committee's 
studies "do not demonstrate that there was a grassy knoll shot." At the core of the finding 
lay, not some abstruse scientist's deduction, but the curiosity ofa rock drummer in Ohio, 
Steve Barber. 
Barber came to the controversy via a girlie magazine. In the summer of 1979 Gallery 
offered its readers, amongst the nudes, a record of the section of the police dictabelt that 
includes the noises said to be gunshots. He played it again and again, and detected 
something the experts had missed. What had been thought to be unintelligible "crosstalk," 
conversation coming in from another radio channel, Barber' s ear identified as the voice of 
Sheriff Bill Decker, in the lead car of the motorcade. The Sheriff's voice occurs at the 
same point on the recording as the sound impulses that the Committee's experts said were 
gunshots. What he is saying is, "Move all men available out ofmy department back into 
the railroad yards there .. . to try to determine just what and where it happened down there. 
And hold everything secure until the homicide and other investigators can get there." 
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Clearly Decker did not issue his orders till after the shooting, so Barber' s discovery 
triggered an onslaught on the acoustics evidence. Because of the timing, the Academy of 
Sciences was to conclude, the sounds on the recording had to be something other than 
gunshots, static perhaps, but not gunshots. 
Barger is unrepentant, in spite of the Academy's decision. ''We used an entirely 
different method of identifying the time at which the recording was made," he says, "Our 
method involved noting what time the police dispatcher said it was. We think our method 
was much more straightforward, and much less subject to error by some extraneous 
artifact than was the Academy's method. Our method is more robust ." 
While Sheriff Decker's orders obviously came a minute or so after the shooting, Dr. 
Barger insists that this could have been caused in several ways. The Dictabelt needle 
could have jumped back - as sometimes occurred with that old-fashioned system - or the 
illusion of "crosstalk" may have been caused during copying of the original police 
recording. 
Dr. Barger stands by his original findings, "The number of detections we made in our 
tests, and the speed of the detections - the odds that that could happen by chance are 
about one in twenty. That's just as plain as the nose on your face ." 
019: Paul McCaghren September 11, 1978 
Paul McCaghren was the former lieutenant of burglary and theft of the Dallas Police 
Department in 1963 . His role in the HSCA investigation would prove to be the 
cornerstone in their investigation, ultimately leading to the conclusion of conspiracy. 
An additional item forced the committee to alter its original presumption that a sole 
assassin fired all shots from the rear. That evidence was a Dallas police tape of the 
gunshots. Expert acoustical analysis of the tape determined that of the four shots fired, 
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three came from the rear and one from the front. This forced the committee to draw its 
second main conclusion: "Scientific acoustical evidence establishes a high probability that 
two gunmen fired at President John F. Kennedy" (HSCA Report, 65). 
The House Select Committee obtained copies of the tape and subjected them to 
acoustical analysis, but the results proved inconclusive. In March 1978, however, the 
committee discovered the original dictabelt and tape recording. Stored in a cabinet until 
1969, the materials then were turned over to Paul McCaghren, director of the Dallas 
Police Intelligence Division. McCaghren retained them until he released them to the 
committee nine years later. 
McCaghren stated that he was part of a team of investigators that looked into the 
events that occurred in the basement ofcity hall, regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack 
Ruby. This inquiry went on for about a month and a half, until it was abruptly called to a 
halt. At this time "all the material in our possession was turned over to Chief Curry, who 
was the chief ofpolice at that time" (HSCA Hearings, II, 108). McCaghren said he never 
saw any ofthe materials again (this would include the dictabelt) until 1969, when the new 
Chief of police, Charles Batchler, found it when he broke open a filing cabinet that he 
found locked. 
McCaghren was told to "take charge ofthe material and to make sure no unauthorized 
person came in contact with it (HSCA Hearings, II, 109). Curry, Batchler' s predecessor, 
had apparently removed numerous materials and subsequently published a book. It does 
make you wonder why Curry didn' t take these also, especially the dictabelt. In his final 
answer, McCaghren stated that he had control of these materials from 1969 until this year 
(1978), when he turned them over to HSCA investigator Jack Moriarty, and that no one, 
not even himself, tampered with anything that was removed from the locked filing cabinet. 
020: David Green September 11, 1978 
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Two observations seem obvious: The experts, who know what to listen for, are 
markedly more accurate than the witnesses who were there that day. Secondly, the dual 
location statistic seems amazingly low. The difference between the two parties don't 
seem to contradict each other as much as they show the wide gulf between the actual 
event and a staged production number. 
021: Thomas Canning September 12, 1978 
Thomas Canning had degrees in mechanical engineering and aeronautics from Stanford 
University. He was also a member ofNASA, a staff engineer of the Space Projects 
Division. 
The Forensic Pathology Panel had already determined that the fatal head shot came 
from above and behind the president, but it was unable to determine, from the available 
medical evidence, whether the bullet that entered Kennedy's back had been fired from 
above, below, or on a level plane. The House Select Committee, therefore, decided to 
have an expert conduct a trajectory analysis to pinpoint the origin of the shots. The 
expert, Thomas Canning, a ballistics trajectories expert and a NASA engineer (Space 
Project Division), used the medical panel's location of the wounds, the photographic 
experts' analysis of the timing of the shots, and the locations of the limousine and its 
occupants. Very careful measurements enabled Canning to conclude that the shots all 
could have been fired from the sixth-floor window of the Book Depository building 
(HSCA Hear;ngs, II, 154-203; Appendfr to HSCA Hearings, VI, 32-62). 
The committee divorced itself from reliability by depending upon the analysis of their 
NASA expert, for determining the trajectory of the bullets that struck President Kennedy 
and Governor Connally. Canning used the location of the wounds on the two men, the 
position of the limousine, the alignment of the occupants of the vehicle, and other 
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information to arrive at his calculations. Those calculations demonstrated that both the 
"single bullet" and the fatal head shot could have been fired from the sixth-floor southeast 
corner window of the Book Depository building (HSCA Report 48) . 
In permitting Canning to perform his trajectory analysis, the committee ignored the 
advice of its own Pathology Panel. The panel cautioned that there is no reliable method of 
"determining the missile trajectory ... particularly if precision within the range of a few 
degrees is required." This was illustrated by Canning's rejection of the objective medical 
evidence. Instead of using the true location of the entrance wound in Kennedy's back 
(approximately five inches below the shoulder), Canning arbitrarily raised it three inches in 
order to arrive at a trajectory consistent with the sixth-floor window. He also computed 
the angle of the wound as twenty-one degrees downward. This was nothing less than a 
blatant distortion of the medical evidence, which proved that the bullet entered the 
president's back at a "slightly upward" angle. Despite similar distortions of other parts of 
the objective medical data, Canning's trajectory analysis resulted in margins of error, by his 
own admission, that would have permitted the assassins to have fired from such diverse 
locations as the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh floors, and the roof of the Depository, as 
well as from the two upper floors of the neighboring Dal-Tex building. The total number 
of sniper locations that would fit Canning's analysis is seventy! Clearly, such lack of 
precision, as well as the manipulation of the objective medical data, belies any serious 
inferences to be drawn from the trajectory analysis (Appendix to HSCA Hearings, VII, 
168-69; VI, 43-56). 
From various sources Canning determined where the President ' s car was on Elm Street 
at Z-312. To establish the head orientation, Canning worked from Z-312. This meant 
that his basic starting datum was Zapruder' s camera. Ifhe could fix the position of the 
camera, the distance to Kennedy' s head, and how his wound-determined straight line 
related to the straight line of sight from Zapruder, he could plot the backward course of 
the bullet - i.e., its trajectory. 
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In theory the method was fine . He could trace his bullet source without ever having to 
say or know anything about true north, the angle of Elm Street and the car, the angle of 
"Oswald' s" shot relative to the midline of the car. But in practice the method was 
complicated; it could not escape the simple "eyeballing" estimates Canning abjured in oral 
testimony, and it was based on certain assumptions that Canning never spelled out or gave 
reason for believing. 
The complications arose with the obvious fact that Kennedy was not showing an exact, 
erect profile to the camera. His head was rotated away from Zapruder, it was tilted away. 
And it was nodded forward . Canning told the committee that he addressed this problem 
by constructing a model ofKennedy' s head and torso and taking a series ofwhat he called 
"calibration photographs," a system that freed him from more eyeball estimates. The 
system seems to have consisted of putting the mannequin in various different attitudes, 
photographing them, and comparing them to one another and to Z-312. (If the 
comparison was done with more than a ruler, protractor, and eyeball, we are never told 
about it .) In oral testimony when the committee was shown the model photograph said to 
duplicate Kennedy in Z-312, Senator Dodd of Connecticut noted that it didn't look nearly 
so tilted as Z-312. Canning replied, "I can assure you the images play games with you" 
(HSCA Hearings, II, 193). After further questioning he conceded that the interpretation 
of these features is a major source of potential error. Before his testimony was done, 
Canning conceded that there was enough potential error in his method for his radius of 
possible gun source to extend not just beyond the book depository to the Dal-Tex building 
across the street, but beyond the Dal-Tex to the Records building (HSCA Hearings, II, 
193, 199). 
To make the final estimate of the degree of forward nod ofKennedy' s head, the HSCA 
trajectory team found the model photo they judged was the best Z-312 replica. It shows 
the mannequin tilted toward a descending plumb bob. The essence of the reference system 
is shown by that vertical line delineated by the plumb, so stated the oral testimony. 
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It is not sufficient to argue that Z-312 was enough for their purposes. Canning himself 
told the committee that it was a difficult frame to work with. It might have been easier if 
he had worked with all of it, that is, ifhe had used the car as was done on the back shot. 
Given the immense amount of time the report says was spent measuring and remeasuring, 
it seems it would have been possible to do a parallel tracking of the trajectory by fixing 
Kennedy' s head relative to the midline of the car and measuring the angle backward from 
the known position of the car. 
In 1964, to accommodate what the Warren Commission believed about the inshoot-
outshoot, the Commission simply decreed a forward head tilt of 59 degrees. This is not 
meant to imply that Canning did not say what he honestly believed. He pointed out to the 
committee the discomforting news that the trajectory of the head shot bullet did not fit 
with the windshield damage that the committee would maintain was caused by "the bullet" 
after it exited from the skull. 
Consider this single vulnerability in the HSCA trajectory analysis: It depends entirely 
on the assumption that Zapruder held his camera perfectly vertical. The HSCA's own 
much ridiculed ')iggles" analysis (aimed at trying to identify when he jumped because he 
heard the shots) cites many times when the camera jittered in his hand. Still the HSCA 
used a straight-to-the-earth plumb line attributing a no-tilt attitude to the camera. A 
skeptical viewer looking at Z-312 might ask why, when the limousine is still to Zapruder' s 
left, and it is going down a 3-degree slope, the front of the car appears to be slightly 
higher than the back. ls it possible Zapruder has his camera tilted slightly to the right? 
Up until now, the report of the Hearings of the House Select Committee has been the 
most detailed, careful, authoritative study available of the ballistics issues involved in the 
assassination ofKennedy. 
022: Marina Oswald Porter September 13, 14 1978 
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It would be fair to say that in the succeeding years after her marriage to Lee Harvey 
Oswald, Marina was the closest person to Lee Harvey Oswald. In 1965, Marina Oswald 
married Kenneth Porter. 
It may be of interest to discuss Marina Oswald's testimony before the Warren 
Commission before her public testimony to The House Select Committee on 
Assassinations is mentioned . 
It strikes me as a rather bizarre coincidence, in an event brimming with coincidences, 
that Marina Oswald was the first witness called by the Warren Commission. Doesn't it 
seem highly unusual that the first of 488 witnesses would be the only one of those 488 
(excluding her counsel) who would not be able to give evidence against Lee Oswald in any 
valid legal proceeding? 
Secondly, here is a woman who was in Irving, Texas, with Ruth Paine, at the time of 
the assassination ofPresident Kennedy. The women immediately suspended mundane 
laundry rituals and focused on the news emanating from the television. When the TSBD 
was announced, the women agreed that they might get a first-hand account of the event 
from Lee when they next saw him. This immediately suggested that Marina Oswald ' s 
knowledge of the event would be limited to conjecture based solely on her husband' s track 
record, and she was not even well versed in that. 
Beyond that, it would seem to make some sense to gather some evidence, perhaps 
from eyewitnesses, law enforcement officials, doctors at Parkland and Bethesda, and 
experts who evaluate evidence, so that when you take the testimony from a character 
witness such as Marina Oswald, you have some material to work from. In essence, 
Marina was called to identify a rifle before there was any evidence in the official record to 
suggest that it needed identification. 
It must also be said that the selection process totally gives away the Warren 
Commission' s claim to objectivity from the very start. In the "Foreward" to the Warren 
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Report, the authors wrote, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, by Executive Order No. 11130 dated November 
29, 1963, created this Commission to investigate the assassination on 
th
November 22, 1963, of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35 President of the 
United States. The President directed the Commission to evaluate all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the assassination and the subsequent killing 
of the alleged assassin and to report its findings and conclusions to him (WC 
Report ix). 
It is difficult to label such an investigation "honest" when it is charged with evaluating 
all the facts, which it did not, and when it had the objective purposes as stated, yet called 
for its first, second, and third witnesses persons whose last name was Oswald. Such a 
choice ofwitness selection strongly suggests the Commission knew the outcome oftheir 
investigation well before they read the oath to the first witness, and only went through the 
488 witness charade to give bulk to a preconceived conclusion. 
After the Oswalds told what they knew (and argued with what they doubted), 
witnesses four and five were the respective attorneys for Marina Oswald and Marguerite 
Oswald, the latter being Mark Lane, who was asked but one-fourth of the questions posed 
to Marina' s lawyer, and then shown the door. Marina, as stated, could only speak for 
Oswald's state ofmind, and then only in Russian. Neither Marguerite nor Robert Oswald 
had seen Lee since November 22, 1962, and Robert was surprised to learn on November 
22, 1963 that he had become an uncle for the second time a month earlier. Attorneys 
Martin and Lane became concerned parties only well after the events ofNovember 22, 
1963. 
Marina Oswald at least drew a good crowd. She averaged 5.5 members of the 
Commission for the February hearings, and most stuck around to hear what the interpreter 
had to say, although that may also be ascribed to the fact that she was the first witness, or 
that the stenographers had not yet realized they should insert the comings and goings of 
the respective Commissioners. 
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After what would become the usual preliminaries, the Chief Justice tried to make Mrs. 
Oswald feel comfortable, assuring her that her rights would be protected, although four 
witnesses later, when Mark Lane was refused the right to represent Oswald, the 
Commission flatly refused to guarantee that the accused' s rights would be protected. Mrs. 
Oswald was then asked where she lived in Dallas, a routine question, but she answered 
that her attorney knew her address, raising the possibility that she did not She was then 
asked, "Are you the widow of the late Lee Harvey Oswald?" as if they did not know (WC 
Hearings, I, 2) . 
The questioners and the witness then got down to their limited agenda, and at least 
they had something to go on, as the witness, in the 71 days since the murder ofher 
husband, had been interviewed by.federal officials 46 times (and Dallas authorities no 
times). When asked if she had seen her husband take the rifle outside, she answered, "I 
never did see it" (WC Hearings, I, 14). This bit of self-defensive perjury was then made 
up for when the witness volunteered data regarding the Walker shooting, her husband's 
practicing with the gun, her husband' s ownership of the pistol, and her taking ofone or 
perhaps two of the backyard photos, which would suggest that she saw the gun at least 
once, since it was in the photos (WC Hearings, I, 14-16). Other instances of her 
willingness to be accommodating will be cited, but to her credit, the witness did tell the 
Commission why she was being so decent: " ... Sometimes the FBI agents asked me 
questions which had no bearing or relationship, and if I didn't want to answer they told me 
that if I wanted to live in this country, I would have to help in this matter, even 
though they were often irrelevant That is the FBI" (WC Hearings, I, 79). She would 
probably soon note a similarity between the Warren Commission and her previously noted 
federal tormentors. 
The similarity began with the Commission's willingness to tell the witness the answers. 
When Marina could not recall which nights Lee took typing lessons, Chief Counsel Rankin 
asked, "Would it help you to recall ifl suggested they were Monday, Tuesday, and 
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Thursday?" (WC Hearings, I, 9) Rankin also helped the witness clarify the Walker 
shooting: "If the Walker shooting was on Wednesday, does that refresh your memory as 
to the day of the week at all?" (WC Hearings, I, 17) Is it my imagination, or do these 
sound like leading questions? 
More information was forthcoming: Oswald had become upset when the FBI had 
come calling in 1962 and he sat in their car for an interview; he always had a passport, 
sometimes two - a statement not pursued nor clarified; Oswald spent his earnings on the 
family, she told, adding, ''But I know that he became active with some kind ofactivity in a 
pro-Cuban committee. I hope that is what you are looking for" (WC Hearings, I, 20-21). 
Mrs. Oswald was asked about her late husband's feelings regarding President Kennedy, 
certainly a valid question. At one point she replied,"... from Lee's behavior I cannot 
conclude that he was against the President, and therefore the thing [the assassination] is 
incomprehensible to me." She later repeated that she had difficulty believing her 
husband's guilt ''Because I had never heard anything bad about Kennedy from Lee" (WC 
Hearings, I, 22, 71). 
In these sessions with the first witness, the Warren Commission would reveal much in 
the way ofthe methodology it planned to pursue. As Mrs. Oswald testified that she had 
no idea the rifle was missing on the night of the Walker shooting, a recess was called, and 
when questioning resumed, it concerned Lee's trip to Mexico, not the Walker event. She 
was then told she'd been shown photos ofGeneral Walker's house, a photo ofNew 
Orleans, and a photo ofLeningrad. She identified the latter two; she was then asked if she 
knew what the third one was (WC Hearings, I, 37-38). 
In spite of the fear of deportation noted above, the witness would not be overly 
accommodating. When the questions got into the area which subsequent researchers have 
noted as an Oswald imposture, Marina would have none of it. When Rankin suggested 
that Oswald had a scope mounted on October 26, a Saturday, Marina balked: "How is it 
about the telescope? He always had the telescope. Were there two?' Rankin claimed the 
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Commission had data, but Marina suggested, "Perhaps someone who looked like Lee" 
(WC Hearings, I, 55). [Two telescopes or two Oswalds?] When the subject of the $189 
check at Hutchinson' s market came up, Marina issued two denials: "He didn 't have such 
a check,'' and later,"... Lee was at work. He couldn't have been there" (WC Hearings, I, 
58, 63) . 
Having asked a couple of valid questions, the interrogation again got silly. Marina was 
asked "Do you recall the weekend that you went to the hospital for your baby?" as well 
as where she spent time with Lee on November 23 . She was also asked if she received 
any calls advising her that her husband was going to be shot, and "Do you know any 
reason why Jack Ruby killed your husband?" ''He didn 't tell me," she replied (WC 
Hearings, I, 54, 77, 79, 83). 
There is a long excursion through Marina' s life story, and at one point she became 
agitated because one piece of evidence, her diploma, had been mangled. Then there is a 
serious exchange over whose handwriting appears in which place on a certain document. 
It turned out that the handwriting was Marina's and the document was a score sheet for a 
game of dominoes (WC Hearings, I, 102). Following that fascinating exchange, words 
are put in her mouth regarding bullets that may or may not have been for the rifle or pistol, 
and the witness goes with the flow. She was helpless, however, when Rankin asked about 
a jacket: "Is it possible that Exhibit 163 was worn by him that morning without your 
knowing it?" As phrased, the only possible answer was "yes,'' since the witness had 
already indicated a lack of knowledge concerning the jacket; with the Warren Commission 
and Lee Oswald, anything was possible (WC Hearings, I, 22). 
The Commissioners still present asked the last four pages of questions after Counsel 
had asked the first 122 pages. As the February proceedings drew to a close. Marina told 
the Chief Justice, "I am very grateful to all of you. I didn' t think among Americans I 
would find so many fiiends ." 
Earl Warren replied, "You have friends here" (WC' Hearings, I, 126). That answer 
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belongs in a book of platitudes alongside the caustic comment attributed to Bertold 
Brecht: "I pity the man who is laughing , for he has not yet been told the bad news." 
When the witness returned in June, one topic of discussion was how Marina had 
prevented Lee from making as assault on former Vice-President Richard Nixon. It is an 
interesting multi-page exchange from the point of view of the give and take of discussion, 
but it adds nothing to our knowledge of the Kennedy case since there is no proof that 
Nixon had any plans to be anywhere near Dallas in April, 1963. Either way, Oswald's 
target was spared when a pregnant Marina kept the former Marine locked in the bathroom 
until he decided to sit it out and read. Commissioner Dulles asked, ' 'Do you know what 
book it was, by chance?" (WC Hearings, V, 392). 
Commissioner John Sherman Cooper then got his opportunity to look as foolish as 
Dulles. "I think you testified before that he made statements showing his dislike of our 
system of government and its economic system." Marina then told of Oswald' s 
complaints, which suggest he was more like the average taxpayer than a potential assassin: 
' 'He used to complain about the educational difficulties and about the unemployment in the 
United States and about the high cost of medical care" (WC Hearings, V, 394). Such 
(and there is more in the record) was Oswald's dislike of"our system of government." 
The imposture concern arose again in the June testimony, although it was never 
addressed in that way. Marina vehemently denied that Oswald drove her to the furniture 
store encounter with Mrs. Whitworth and Mrs. Hunter, and issued equally strong denials 
that she once accompanied him to have a scope mounted (WC Hearings, V, 400-401). 
The June testimony concluded with questions posed to Marina by her attorney, who 
then requested certain of Oswald ' s belongings be returned to his estate. Chief Justice 
Warren was unclear in his response, but suggested that the gun would not be among the 
items returned. Marina' s counsel insisted that the gun be part of the deal, and added that 
they would like Lee' s wedding ring returned that day. Warren replied that the entire 
Commission must decide the issue (WC Hearings, V, 420). Was Oswald's wedding ring 
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evidence to be used against a dead man? 
Mrs. Oswald ' s next appearance was in July, and involved 48 pages of furniture store 
testimony from Marina, Edith Whitworth, and Gertrude Hunter, who insisted it was Lee, 
Marina and the two children who arrived in the car with Oswald driving. Having given 
their thoughts, they left and Marina was then questioned. She strongly denied the event, 
but was then asked by Counsel Liebeler, "You are sure of that in spite of the testimony 
that you heard this morning from Mrs. Whitworth and Mrs. Hunter; is that right?" (WC 
Hearings, XI, 276-290; 300). 
It was also during this testimony that Marina was shown the photo of the Walker home 
with a 1957 Chevy out front with a hole where the license plate should have been. Marina 
insisted that the picture was intact when she was first shown the exhibit by the FBI. 
Liebeler told her it was impossible (WC Hearings, XI, 294). Ifwe believe the photo 
exhibited in Chief Curry' s memoirs, The Assassination Files, Marina was being more 
honest than the Commission. 
Her final appearance before the "Warren Commission," on September 6, 1964 was 
instructive. Commissioners Russell, Cooper, and Boggs flew to the US Naval Air Station 
in Dallas, where the testimony was taken. In this final meeting, the translators were also 
sworn to tell the truth, and the questions then immediately focused on Marina' s past 
statements, with perjury strongly hinted at. Some of the answers then changed, or became 
obfuscated, and Marina at one point suggested that perhaps the Commission did not 
receive a precise translation. This is a curious point, and one that requires comment, as 
Marina Oswald never had the same translator twice (why not?), although her many FBI 
interviews and her first Commission appearance were all translated by Secret Service 
Agent Leon Gopadze (WC Hearings, V, 588ff.). Of equal note, this testimony is not 
noted in the contents of the 26 volumes; it just appears in Volume V, pp. 588ff. 
In this session, the same questions were asked repeatedly, almost suggesting the 
technique of "hostile interrogation." The witness did admit that she knew Lee had plans 
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for going to Mexico, although when asked if she knew either Clay Bertrand or Sylvia 
Odio, the response was in the negative (WC Hearings, V, 293 , 614). The simple fact that 
such questions were asked about people the Warren Commission did not want the world 
to know of is enlightening. 
She then stunned her interrogators with an answer that has since provided much food 
for thought: "I feel that - I hardly believe - that Lee Oswald really tried to kill President 
Kennedy . .. I feel in my own mind that Lee did not have President Kennedy as a prime 
target when he assassinated him ... I think it was Connally" (WC Hearings, V, 607). After 
an all too brief exploration of that theory, Commissioner Boggs concluded his questioning 
in a most oblique and uninformative way: "One further question, and this is off the 
record." The record then suggests that there were questions and answers (plural) that will 
remain unknown to us (WC Hearings, V, 609). 
Thus, Marina Oswald was not able to add a great deal to what was known. Some of 
her unwillingness to accept the imposture indicates that we know less after her testimony 
than before; earlier, there was evidence that either Oswald or an impostor did various 
things; when her testimony was done, we have her word that he didn't, but only deafening 
silence from the Commission. 
Perhaps they had not warmed to their task, and perhaps they never would, but the 
Commissioners simply did not put meaningful, valid questions to Marina Oswald. What 
was needed was courtroom like precision: When he took the gun to work the bolt, how 
long did he do so? What did he do with it then? How frequent was this? Was there a 
pattern to this? Did he speak of his guns often? Did he commonly threaten anyone, inside 
or outside of the US political structure? 
The other line of questioning that should have been more vigorously pursued was Lee 
Oswald's feelings for his children. It is known that he was brutal at times to his wife, and 
the Commission explored that briefly, but what of the children? The Oswald we have 
come to know did suggest a loving father, and that, to me at least, indicated that a man 
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was less likely to commit a crime that would forever deprive him of the company ofthose 
children, or would forever tarnish the name of those offspring. 
Today, those "children" are adults with families of their own, and they are still seeking 
a truthful clarification of their father's participation in the events ofNovember 22, 1963. 
Marina Oswald also seeks that answer. In retrospect, she feels that she was badly used by 
the Warren Commission, and in searching for a word, she came up with "ploy." She also 
noted that it was upsetting to her to be asked to give evidence against her husband, and 
when she did so - not when the questioning was mundane, but when she offered evidence 
- Gerald Ford would take eager note of the answer and would shortly excuse himself from 
the hearing room. 
Marina offered no new revelations before the House Committee on Assassinations. 
She testified about Russia, New Orleans and Dallas at length, but in the end, no new 
information was garnered than the three times she testified before the Warren 
Commission. 
023: Jack D. White September 14, 1978 
Mr. Jack White received a B.A. in journalism and history from Texas Christian 
University in 1949. He was vice-president ofWitherspoon and Associates, Ft. Worth' s 
largest advertising and public relations firm. 
When Jack White, a longtime assassination researcher, got up to testify about the 
backyard photographs, the Committee tried to make a fool of someone who has worked 
on the photographic aspect of the case for many years. Mr. Goldsmith asked him, "To 
what extent, if any, did you compute photogrammetically the effect ofan object's tilt on 
its apparent length in the photograph" (HSCA Hearings, II, 340). 
"As I said, I am not a scientist, I don't indulge in that sort of thing." Jack White 
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examined different photographs of the various rifles we are told were the murder weapon. 
"I found that most of the reference points through which I extended vertical lines could 
not be made to line up." Genzman, his questioner, asked: "Did you line up the metal 
parts?" "Yes, I made prints where the metal parts of the rifle, that is, from the muzzle to 
the trigger guard, were all identical lengths." Genzman: "After lining up the metal parts, 
what did you determine about the stocks?" "I determined that the butts were different 
lengths after lining up the metal parts" (HSCA Hearings, II, 344). 
Goldsmith continues, ''When you did this study, did you compute photogrammetically 
the effect of the tilt on the way that the length of an object appears in a photograph?" 
(HSCA Hearings, II, 344). 
"I conducted a study by photographing a yardstick from three different-" 
"Mr. White, answer my question. Did you compute photogrammetically-" 
' 'What is photogrammetically? Describe to me what photogrammetically is." 
"I just have one more question, Mr. White. Do you know what photogrammetically 
is?" 
"No." 
"I have no further questions, thank you." 
Jack White did get a minor rebuttal when he said: "Thank you. I appreciate the 
opportunity to present this as a private citizen who has no large budget to work with. I 
am just an ordinary person who has observed a lot of things and I am really here to present 
questions rather than answers" (HSCA Hearings, II, 345). 
Rather than deal with the real issues such as the allegedly fake photographs or the 
different rifles, also alleged to be the murder weapon, the Committee preferred to grapple 
with side issues such as whether or not the backyard photos were taken with Oswald ' s 
Reflex camera. Photographic expert Robert Groden would have none of this. He told the 
Committee, "You were all aware that some of the arguments presented were no longer 
issues and that some of them never really were. The true issues were not accurately dealt 
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with in the hearings. These were the discrepancies of the head to body size as well as the 
height-to-rifle length ratio and the visual retouching of the skin and surrounding area" 
(Appendix to HSCA Hearings, VI, 295). 
The panel ofexperts alleged that the minute indentations along the film plate aperture 
matched those of the pictures. Jack White said in his final minute, "There was one area of 
questioning which I had hoped to get into, which because of the shortness of time before 
lunch I was not permitted to go into. That is the question of the DeMohrenschildt picture. 
The DeMohrenschildt picture shows a much larger amount ofbackground around the 
edges than any ofthe photographs, 133-A, B or C. To me, this indicates that the 
DeMohrenschildt picture is printed full negative. In fact, we can verify this because it is 
printed with a black border around the edge, the black border being the clear area around 
the edge of the negative. 
"According to the FBI, the picture, CE-133-B, was identified as being taken with 
Oswald's camera because it could be matched to the film plate aperture. Yet, if the 
DeMohrenschildt picture shows a larger background area and it is taken from the same 
camera viewpoint, then 133-A, Band C have all been cropped and, therefore, if there is 
more background area in the picture, then it could not possibly be matched to the film 
plane aperture" (HSCA Hearings, II, 346). 
The Committee had no answer for this. 
Instead, the Committee chose to try and discredit Mr. White, ' 'Have you ever had the 
occasion to take the original negative from 133-B and analyze it with a computer by a 
technique called 'digital image processing'?" "No, obviously not." 
''Have you had any training in analytical photogrammetry?" Goldsmith asked. ''No" 
"Have you had any formal training in forensic photography?" ''No." 
"Have you had any formal training in the study of shadows in photographs?" ''No." 
(HSCA Hearings, II, 338-39). 
Again, referring to the backyard photographs, Mr. White says, ' 'By the way, at the time 
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that these pictures were made, there is no grass on the ground in Dallas, and there are no 
leaves on the trees. The date of these pictures supposedly is March 29. I live in Texas, 
and I see the trees come out. It is usually late April before you have this amount of foliage 
on the grass, the bushes, and the trees. So I think shadows were added by transparent 
retouching, just as the British photo expert (Detective Thompson) said. 
White continues, "Some of the shadows were added improperly. For instance, the 
shadow of the post by the head of the figure on Bis much wider than the same shadow on 
A And also as he pointed out, when they cut their airbrush fiisket, the knife must have 
slipped because the post becomes crooked in B and it is not crooked in A" (HSCA 
Hearings, II, 336). 
We only have the testimony ofMarina Oswald to say that she took the pictures. She 
would have said anything to avoid deportation, and she has given different stories at 
different times. She did not recall how many pictures she took. First she said one, but 
they found two; then years later, they found a third, interestingly enough, among the 
possessions of George DeMohrenschildt, a friend ofLee Harvey Oswald. He wrote in 
his book that he felt Oswald was innocent. 
Marina first told the FBI that she took the photos in late February or early March, but 
of course there were no leaves then, or grass. She told the Warren Commission that the 
first time she ever saw the rifle was toward the end ofMarch. She then said that she took 
the photos within seven or ten days of that. Chief Counsel Blakey tells us that "A rifle and 
a revolver were shipped to Oswald from different mail order houses on March 20. So it 
was decided that the picture was taken on a Sunday, March 31 , 1963" (HSCA Hearings, 
II, 320). But there are no leaves on the trees then, and no grass. 
Again, "Mr. White, what was your method of analysis?" 
"I utilized various methods. First of all was just scrutiny, you might say - just looking 
at the photos to see how things in one photo compared with things in the other photos. I 
also made measurements. I made photocopies and printed them in various sizes. I made 
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transparencies which I overlaid one over the other to make certain comparisons, and 
things of that sort" (HSCA Hearings, II, 323). 
White outlines his evidence for the faking ofthe photos, and says, "It is fairly obvious 
after the fact that they were made to implicate Oswald in the assassination by tying him to 
the alleged assassination weapon" (HSCA Hearings, II, 325). 
The Committee chose not to believe the analysis ofMr. Jack White. 
024: Sgt. Cecil W. Kirk September 14, 15, 25 1978 (w/C. McCamy) 
Sgt. Cecil Kirk was called to examine and determine the authenticity of the famous 
Oswald backyard photographs. Sgt. Kirk had studied forensic photography and worked 
for the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for 17 years in the Identification Branch. 
It gets a bit confusing when reading Sgt. Kirk' s testimony as to how many backyard 
photographs there are, along with the sources from which the various photographs were 
acquired. 
As far as the photographs are concerned, there are three: A, B and C. You will 
sometimes see them referred to as Dees, Stovall or DeMohrenschildt. The first two are 
Dallas Police Officers and the latter being an oil baron who befriended Oswald while in 
Texas. (He later committed suicide days before he was to appear before the House 
Committee to testify). The names just refer to the sources from which various copies 
were acquired. 
The most famous of the three backyard photographs is 133-A that was made popular 
on February 21 , 1964, when it graced the cover ofL{fe magazine. The critics have always 
suggested that these photos had been faked . In fact, when Oswald was interrogated by 
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Capt. Fritz after he was arrested, he also said that the pictures had been faked through the 
process of superimposition. The most glaring problem is that ofOswald' s chin. In every 
other photograph ofOswald, his chin is narrow, almost cleft. But in all three of the 
backyard photographs, his chin is broad and square. The House Committee said that 
Oswald was suffering from chin acne when these pictures were taken. 
Not to sound equivocating, but problems abound on both sides of the debate. Marina 
stated that she took the photographs, but when shown them she was not I 00% sure. Her 
testimony has changed and varied over the years in respect to the photos. There are 
anomolies in the sizing. The gun was 40 inches long; Oswald was about 5' IO", or 70", 
which should create a perfect 4-7 ratio. When you try this, however, what happens is that 
either the gun is 46 inches long, or Oswald is only 5'3". 
The Warren Commission stated, as did the House Committee, that the pictures were 
taken in that camera, to the exclusion ofall others. The photographic panel, ofcourse, did 
not settle this debate. 
025: Joseph P. McNally September 14, 25 1978 
A document expert, and a member of the American Society of Questioned Document 
Examiners, McNally was called upon by the House Committee, along with Charles C. 
Scott and David J. Purtell, to assess the authenticity ofthe "Historic Diary" Oswald 
supposedly kept in the USSR. McNally had received a BS and an MP A in police science 
from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, University ofNew York City in 1967 and 
1975 respectively. Purtell received a PH.B, with a major in mathematics and chemistry, 
from Northwestern University in 1949. Scott received an AA degree from Kansas City 
Junior College in 1930 and a JD from the University of Missouri School ofLaw in 1935 
whereupon he became a member of the Missouri bar. 
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The panel followed standard procedures and techniques in its examinations. The 
writings and signatures were looked at individually and in juxtaposition with each other, 
taking into consideration the gross characteristics of the writing process, writing skill, 
slant, speed, proportions of the letters, ratio of small to capital letters, height ratio, lateral 
spacing, and overall writing pattern. Significant differences were looked for. A 
stereoscope microscope was used for minute examination and comparison of individual 
letters and characteristics. 
One of the issues addressed to these experts queried, Was the "historic diary" written 
in one sitting? As to this, the panel concluded that, ''Because of the poor condition of the 
historical diary, they are unable to conclude firmly whether it was written at one or more 
than one sitting. On balance, it appears to have been written at one or a few sittings." 
The problem referred to regarding the condition of the diary can best be understood 
from the comments ofDavid J. Purtell . He stated that with respect to the timespan of the 
historical diary, an answer cannot be provided because of the present condition of the 
paper. The documents had been processed by the silver nitrate method in a attempt to 
develop latent fingerprints . While a recognized method, the drawback is that it soils the 
paper; the silver nitrate which remains on the paper causes it to turn black in time. Today, 
the pages are in very poor condition, and though the message can be read in part, it is a 
very difficult task. One observation that can be reported is that one sheet of paper is of a 
different weight (thickness) than the other sheets. 
Although scientifically dating the age of the writing might have proven helpful, the 
inability to do so did not prevent addressing the truly crucial issue, which might be stated 
in the question: Was this document an accumulation of random entries, each entry having 
been made on the date indicated contemporaneous with the events being recorded? 
As to the very important question, the answer is most unsettling, for it appears to be 
rather clear that this document, upon which so much reliance has been placed in 
reconstructing the defection, is a phony. In other words, Lee Harvey Oswald ' s diary was 
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station chief in several countries overseas and had held senior positions at CIA 
headquarters, to testify at a public hearing the Committee had scheduled for September 
15, 1978. Hart had retired in 1972 but had been recalled in 1976 to do a study of the 
Nosenko case and write a report for internal circulation. 
Hart sought to explain away the discrepancies the House Committee had noted 
between Nosenko ' s story to the CIA in 1964 and what he told the Committee in 1978. 
The deputy chief of the Soviet Russia Division never intended to make a valid assessment 
ofNosenko' s truthfulness, Hart declared, and he quoted a note written by the D.C.(or the 
deputy chief of the Soviet Russia Division) that, he said, indicated the real purpose of the 
polygraph tests: "To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in 
fabricating an ostensible Nosenko confession ... .Insofar as we could make one consistent 
and believable even to the Soviets, a confession would be useful in any eventual disposal 
ofNosenko." ''Did you use the term eventual disposal of him?" Hart was asked by 
Congressman Sawyer. "I used the term, eventual disposal, yes sir, Hart replied. 
Hart ' s presentation was a devastating indictment of the CIA' s handling ofNosenko. 
Hart commented that the agency failed miserably in its handling of the entire case. He did 
not succeed in rebutting the staff report, which maintained that Nosenko, at least on the 
subject of Oswald and the assassination, was a fraud . Congressman Christopher J. Dodd 
pressed Hart on this point: ' 'Why should this Committee believe anything that Mr. 
Nosenko has said when ... you state he was intimidated, not interrogated, for more than 
three years, that he was ... a man of very short memory, that he was a drunk or at least 
heavily drinking during part of the questioning .. . Why then should we believe any of the 
statements ofMr. Nosenko, which from point to point contradict each other?" Hart 
answered that he could not say Nosenko had contradicted himself, except on the subject 
of Oswald. "The important things . . . he has produced ... which the Agency has been able to 
check on,'' he said, "have, by and large, proved out." It was evident that Hart was 
avoiding the Oswald issue. 
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Dodd referred Hart to the section of the staff report that covered Nosenko ' s 
contradiction on the surveillance of Oswald in the Soviet Union. "Let me express an 
opinion on Mr. Nosenko's testimony about Lee Harvey Oswald," said Hart. "I, like many 
others, find Mr. Nosenko's testimony incredible ... I, as recently as last week, talked to Mr. 
Nosenko and tried to get him to admit that there was a possibility that he didn ' t know 
everything that was going on. I find it hard to believe that the KGB had so little interest in 
Oswald .... There, if I were in the position of deciding whether to use the testimony ofMr. 
Nosenko . .. , I would not use it." Hart tended to attribute Nosenko's unreliability on 
Oswald to innocent oversight, pointing out that the KGB, like the CIA, is a 
compartmentalized organization, and contact could have been made with Oswald without 
Nosenko knowing about it. 
The D.C. had other ideas, which he wished to convey to the Committee. He sent the 
House Committee his analysis of the staff report along with a point-by-point rebuttal of 
Hart's testimony. 
027: Sr. Eusebio Azcue Lopez September 18, 1978 
Eusebio Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City in September 1963, at the time 
Lee Harvey Oswald supposedly visited there. When Oswald (or an Oswald impersonator) 
found out from consulate employee Silvia Duran that it would take a week for him to get 
a visa to travel to Cuba, Oswald had a temper tantrum until Azcue, the consul himself, 
was forced to step in. 
Azcue was shown a photograph of Oswald and was asked if this was the man who 
visited him in September 1963 . He said, "This gentleman .. .is not the person who went to 
the consulate ... the man ... was .. . over 30 years of age and very, very thin faced ...He was ... 
dark blond ...He had a hard face. He had very straight eyebrows, cold, hard, and straight 
eyes. His cheeks were thin. His nose was very straight and pointed ." No one has ever 
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described Oswald as having "straight eyes." Azcue was not questioned by the Warren 
Commission. He did, however, testify before the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations. The Committee showed Azcue photographs of Oswald, and he said this 
was not the man at the consulate. 
028: St. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz September 18, 1978 
Alfredo Mirabal was the consul for the Cuban embassy in Mexico City in September of 
1963 . He succeeded Senor Azcue in his position. He claims to have seen Lee Harvey 
Oswald on two separate occasions during his service as consulate of the Cuban embassy. 
Although Mirabal didn't actually take care of Oswald, he was there to hear the 
confrontation between him and Senor Azcue, who was still there training Mr. Mirabal at 
his job. Mirabal stated that "from the very first moment it appeared to me as if this 
instance could be the case of provocation. I sensed that there was an intent to create some 
kind ofa scandal, ofa disturbance. That was my feeling" (HSCA Hearings, III, 174). 
He stated that this happened on two occasions and lasted for about 15-20 minutes each 
time. He said the two visits happened shortly after his arrival to the embassy as an 
employee. 
After the assassination, Sylvia Duran, the secretary at the embassy, commented that the 
"alleged assassin is the same person that came to the consulate" (HSC'A Hearings, III, 
175). Even though he did not speak English at the time, he assured the committee that if 
something would have been said by Oswald of a culpatory nature, Senor Azcue or the 
secretary would have informed him. 
Mr. Mirabal said that he remembered Oswald presenting a card or credentials that 
indicated he belonged to the Communist Party of the United States. He responded: "I also 
have been a Communist for a number of years and that generally we do not use credentials 
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or a card to identify ourselves ... we are identified to ourselves as Communists by our own 
behavior and by our own ideas. I was surprised by his unusual interest in using 
identification as a Communist" (HSCA Hearings, Ill, 176). 
There is no question that Oswald went to Mexico City. When he was told he needed a 
photo for his visa application, he went out, had one taken, and brought it back, giving it to 
Sylvia Duran, the secretary. She indicated that the man in the photo was the man who 
came to the embassy, and the man in the photo is Lee Harvey Oswald. The Cubans have 
since released the original application and photo, which authenticated the published 
copies. Some confusion arose from Duran' s description of Oswald as "blond," but brown 
hair like Oswald ' s is often lumped into the blond category, I am told, in Mexico. 
029: Thomas J. Kelley September 19, 1978 
Thomas Kelley served as secret service liaison to the Warren Commission. He was the 
assistant director ofProtective Intelligence and Investigations in Washington, D.C., and 
was currently the assistant director ofProtective Operations in Washington, D.C. 
Mr. Kelley was a Secret Service inspector who attended most of the Saturday and 
Sunday interrogations ofOswald. The Warren Commission asked him nothing about that 
when he testified before that commission on June 4, 1964. Most of his questions dealt 
with the use of a 1950' s Cadillac as a stand-in for the 1961 Lincoln limousine in the 
reenactment of the motorcade. 
In one reference before the Warren Commission, he spoke of the shoulder wound, and 
was corrected by Arlen Specter: ' 'By the wound in the shoulder, do you mean the wound 
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in the back of the President's neck, the base of his neck?" (WC Hearings, V, 175). 
Again, before the Warren Commission, Allen Dulles had a concern about the people on 
the overpass: "Were they helping to guard the overpass or just the spectators?" Kelley 
answered that they were doing repairs (WC Hearings, V, 175-76). Either way it is moot; 
they did not belong there. 
As stated, Kelley was asked nothing of substance before the Warren Commission. 
They didn 't ask him about anything substantive regarding the interviews he attended, nor 
about recent threats against the President. 
Thomas Kelley added nothing to the record that he hadn 't previously stated before the 
Warren Commission. 
030: James J. Rowley September 19, 1978 
James Rowley was the chief of the Secret Service on November 22, 1963 . He had 
been head of the White House detail from 1946 to 1961. He was in Washington D . C. , at 
the time of the assassination. Much of his testimony before the Warren Commission 
defended Secret Service procedures and tried to create the impression that they were 
doing the best job they could on a limited budget. 
Before the Warren Commission, Rowley claimed he notified the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to close the border, but there were no questions as to whether it 
was done, nor was documentary proof exhibited (WC Hearings, V, 451 ). When asked if 
he felt ifthere were any failures by the Service on November 22, he answered, "No" (WC 
Hearings, V, 472). 
He was not asked who planned the motorcade, or about the tum at Elm and Houston 
streets, or about the Service' s continued interest in the case after November 22, when they 
theoretically lost jurisdiction. 
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James Rowley added nothing to the record that he hadn 't previously stated before the 
Warren Commission. 
031: James R. Malley September 20, 1978 
James Malley was an FBI inspector and in charge of all the FBI agents assigned to the 
assassination case in Dallas as of6:00p.m., November 22, 1963 . He played an important 
role in putting together the Bureau' s four-volume report on the assassination given to the 
President in December 1963 . At the time, the FBI had no legitimate jurisdiction because 
President Kennedy's murder was not a federal crime. Malley told the Warren Commission 
that the CIA would not release the photo purportedly of Oswald leaving the Cuban 
embassy in Mexico City in September 1963, unless all background detail was trimmed 
away. What remained was a silhouetted photo of a man (decidedly not Oswald) that could 
have been taken by anybody, anywhere, at any time. 
The photo of the man, that obviously was not Oswald, was a blunder by the Central 
Intelligence Agency. There is no doubt by anyone, on either side of the assassination 
issue, that Lee Harvey Oswald went to Mexico City in September of 1963 . 
Otherwise, Mr. Malley added nothing further to the record. 
032: James H. Gale September 20, 1978 
In 1963 James Gale was the Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division. 
He was in charge of approximately seven inspectors and about 25 permanent inspector' s 
aides . He was responsible to make inspections of every seat of the government division as 
well as each of the fifty-six field offices on at least a one-time-per-year basis. 
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He was instructed to complete an analysis of any investigative deficiencies in the case 
ofLee Harvey Oswald. He stated before the committee that "there were certain 
investigative and reporting delinquencies in the investigation for which administrative 
action should be taken against the responsible personnel" (HSCA Hearings, III, 527). 
Some of the excuses given by the Dallas personnel was: "Oswald had been drinking to 
excess and beat up his wife on several occasions. The agent indicated there should be a 
60-day cooling-off period and Mr. Hoover said that was certainly an asinine excuse" 
(HSCA Hearings, III, 527). It was further believed that after Oswald returned to Dallas, 
no interview was conducted ofhim because they said they were trying to avoid giving the 
impression that she was being harassed or hounded because of her immigrant status. Gale 
felt that Mrs. Oswald should have been interviewed because she was far more likely to 
cooperate when she was angry. 
Mr. Gale testified that Lee Harvey Oswald should have been on the Security Index, 
which was a list of names of individuals who are participants in activities of subversive 
organizations, or who had anarchist or revolutionary beliefs. They were also seen as 
people likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by some national emergency to 
endanger the public safety. The Field and seat of government employees didn't feel that 
Oswald qualified for the Security index. Mr. Gale did feel he qualified due to his contact 
with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee. He had passed out pamphlets and placed a 
placard around his neck reading, ' 'Hands off, viva Fidel." He had defected to Russia. He 
had advised the Department of State that he would furnish the Soviets any information he 
had acquired as a Marine aviation electronics expert . He also gave the example of Oswald 
being arrested "for passing out Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets on the street" (HSCA 
Hearings, 111, 529) . He was, in fact, arrested for disturbing the peace, not for passing out 
pamphlets. He then met with agent Quigley of the FBI on Saturday for a reason 
unbeknownst to anyone. 
Mr. Gale went on to say that 17 employees at the Federal Bureau of Investigation were 
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disciplined, including supervisors and field agents. Some were censured and some were 
also put on probation. He also felt that some of the FBI agents who testified before the 
Warren Commission were too flamboyant, not limiting their testimony to facts the way 
they were suppose to as FBI personnel. 
As far as Oswald ' s passport was concerned, the FBI felt that putting a stop on it was 
open to interpretation. This was due largely to not knowing whether or not he had any 
intelligence assignments at that time. Mr. Gale explained that this was based on his 
Russian background, his defection to Russia and his activities with the Fair Play for Cuba 
Committee (HSCA Hearings, III, 542). 
He also stated that he didn't learn about the note that Oswald left at the Dallas office 
until after he had left the FBI. When Chairman Stokes asked him if James Hosty was one 
of the men that disciplinary action was taken against, he said: "Yes; he was. " (HSCA 
Hearings, III, 545). This was of course referring to the note that had been left at the 
Dallas office for FBI agent Hosty. After Oswald had been killed by Jack Ruby, agent 
Hosty was told by his superior to get rid of the note. 
Mr. Gale's final remarks before the committee are rather noteworthy: "Insofar as the 
investigation of Oswald, insofar as the pre-assassination investigation of Oswald, 
obviously would not give the agents who conducted the investigation a rating of ten. I 
possibly would give them a rating of maybe six or seven, insofar as the investigation of 
Oswald was concerned, the preassassination of Oswald" (HSCA Hearings, III, 557). 
033: President Gerald R. Ford September 21, 1978 
He was a Warren Commission member, and later became the 38th President of the 
United States. Early in his testimony, when talking to Chairman Stokes, President Ford 
stated that he had "seen no new evidence that would change my views as a former member 
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of the Commission" (HSCA Hearings, Ill, 564). In the summer of 1997 the 
Assassinations Records Review Board released a document that caused quite a stir within 
the Kennedy assassination community. It was revealed that the initial draft of the final 
report of the Warren Commission stated that President Kennedy was shot in the back, 
only to be changed by Gerald Ford to the back of the neck. This of course makes the 
single-bullet theory much more plausible and tenable. President Ford said that this change 
was for clarity, not conspiracy. Needless to say, his explanation was not accepted in the 
critics community. 
President Ford said that if the Commission would have known about assassination 
plans between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Mafia, it certainly would have 
required an inquiry into those kinds of operations by an agency of the Federal 
Government. He stated, however, that he didn't think the plots in and of themselves 
would have changed the conclusions of the Commission. 
Mr. Devine felt Gerald Ford was the most conscientious member of the Commission, 
having attended more meetings and interviewed more witnesses than anyone else on the 
Commission at that time (HSCA Hearings, III, 575-76). That isn 't exactly correct. He 
had a good record, just not the best. 
Mr. Ford was asked why Jack Ruby wasn't taken to Washington for questioning, as he 
had requested. His response was that after Chief Justice Warren and the rest of the staff 
finished interrogating him, it just didn't seem necessary to bring him to Washington for 
further investigation. His brother Earl Ruby was brought to Washington, yet Jack was 
required to testify from his cell in Dallas. Mr. Ford said he didn't think it would have a 
meaningful purpose if they brought him to Washington (HSCA Hearings, III, 577) . 
Mr. Devine seemed to probe the relationship of Allen Dulles, former Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, with the Commission and the CIA simultaneously. We know 
that Allen Dulles didn't share with the Commission the plots with the mafia to assassinate 
Fidel Castro. This may not have changed the outcome of the Warren Commission, but it 
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can 't be said that Mr. Dulles was being totally honest either. 
Mr. Ford spent most of the remainder of his testimony mapping out the lone-nut 
scenario. He does concede that after 14 years, no one has been able to precisely pin down 
a motive for the assassination by Lee Harvey Oswald ofPresident Kennedy (HSCA 
Hearings, III, 581 ). 
When Mr. Fithian asked Mr. Ford about the bullets found in the limousine, and that the 
Warren Report said their origin couldn't be determined through spectography or neutron 
activation analysis, he responded, "I am not able to recollect that detail as to what tests, if 
any, were conducted at that time" (HSCA Hearings, III, 589). 
034: John Sherman Cooper September 21, 1978 (w/John J. McCloy) 
A Warren Commission member, a Republican Senator from Kentucky, Cooper 
objected strongly to the "magic bullet" theory saying, "there is no evidence that both men 
(Connally and Kennedy) were hit by the same bullet." 
It is interesting that at the very beginning ofMr. Cooper' s testimony a gentleman is 
identified as assisting Mr. Cooper, Mr. McCloy and also President Ford. It is David Belin. 
Mr. Belin had probably been the most outspoken apologist for the findings of the Warren 
Commission. Why would Cooper, McCloy and Ford, all lawyers and former members of 
the Warren Commission, need anyone there to help them with the questions? President 
Ford stated during his testimony that he doubted if many people had ever read the Warren 
Report (888 pages). I am absolutely convinced, having studied this case for over twenty 
years, including many discussions with hundreds of people, that Mr. Ford is correct. 
have always been suspicious if any one member of the Warren Commission ever read the 
entire Report, not even to mention the 17, 740 pages that make up the 26 volumes of 
testimony and exhibits. 
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Mr. Cooper states early on in a prepared statement: "to be very honest. . . I held in my 
mind during the life of the Commission, as I have since, that there had been three shots 
and that a separate shot struck Governor Connally" (HSCA Hearings, III, 600). He 
further said, however, that "it did not alter the conclusion of the Commission that Oswald 
was the sole assassin and there was no conspiracy" (HSCA Hearings, III, 600). 
Mr. Cooper went on to rehash some of the standard arguments for the lone-assassin: 
the rifle, cartridge shells, markings on the bullets, killer seen by several witnesses, his 
immediate flight and the fact that the killer fled from the Texas School Book Depository 
(HSCA Hearings, III, 609). He concludes that the Commission found no trace of 
conspiracy! Mr. McCloy would later disagree with the no-trace theory. 
035: John J. McCloy September 21, 1978 (w/John Sherman Cooper) 
John J. McCloy testified with John Sherman Cooper and merely restated what he, 
along with the other members of the Commission, had previously said when interviewed. 
He says that there were questions of style in the preparation of the Report, but that he had 
no question whatever about the substance ofthe Report (HSCA Hearings, III, 601). 
As Chief Justice Warren very bluntly put it, "Truth is our only goal." 
He then went on to rehash the same arguments put forth by President Ford about the 
benefit of the very skilled and valuable investigative services at their disposal. 
He later stated that he traced every step that he thought Oswald took after he 
committed the crime. There does seem to be an assumption ofguilt on Mr. McCloy' s part 
in reference to Lee Harvey Oswald. 
He disagreed with Mr. Cooper about the veracity of the single-bullet theory, due 
mainly to his experience in World War I in France. The unpredictability of a bullet is 
always to be granted; it is the condition ofthe bullet, more than anything else. That has 
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caused the doubts to arise in the critics comer. 
He did admit that "insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there has been so much 
talk about it that I don't think I need to dwell on it any further. I no longer feel we simply 
had no credible evidence or reliable evidence in proof ofa conspiracy, but I rather think 
the weight ofevidence is affirmatively against the existence ofa conspiracy, though it falls 
short of proof' (HSCA Hearings, III, 605). 
Even though Cooper and McCloy disagreed about the tenability of the single-bullet 
theory and the amount ofevidence for a conspiracy, they still held tight to the lone-nut 
apology. 
036: J. Lee Rankin September 21, 1978 
J. Lee Rankin was the former General Counsel of the Warren Commission. He 
recalled the process of setting up the different divisions and responsibilities to be given to 
each area (HSCA Hearings, III, 613). There were five different areas assigned, with two 
lawyers on each of the areas. 
The questioning, as with the other Warren Commission members, focused on the 
cooperation of the other federal agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI. He remarked, 
along with the other members of the Commission, that he was unaware of the CIA/Mafia 
plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. He wished the CIA and the FBI had given the 
Commission more information, and that leads would have been followed up, but that there 
was nothing that would have altered the final conclusion of the Warren Commission. 
The question of where Oswald was going when he allegedly shot Officer Tippit again 
raises its head, and again, no answer, only speculation. Mr. Sawyer doesn't want to quit 
asking about the Tippit connection and what Oswald was doing at the time (HSCA 
Hearings, III, 618). Rankin' s response is the same every time: speculations aren't worth 
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very much. 
When asked why they didn't interview Yuri Nosenko and his possible connections of 
Oswald's activities in Russia, Rankin simply told the Committee that the CIA "had told us 
that he was a fake and not a real KGB officer and that he was probably just planted on us" 
(HSCA Hearings, III, 620). 
He then covered the same subjects that Cooper, McCloy, Ford and Griffin covered: 
the Jack Ruby request to testify in Washington, the Yuri Nosenko issue, the ability to fire 
Oswald's alleged rifle within the required time indicated by the Zapruder film, the 
cooperation ofother federal agencies, the single-bullet theory, and Oswald's purpose and 
direction when supposedly confronted by Officer Tippit. All in all, Mr. Rankin added very 
little to the record that we didn't already have given by the other former members ofthe 
Warren Commission. 
037: Nicholas Katzenbach September 21, 1978 
Nicholas Katzenbach was the deputy attorney general under Robert Kennedy in 
November of 1963. The most famous piece of evidence that Mr. Katzenbach is known for 
is his memo to LBJ's press secretary, Bill Moyers on November 25, 1963 . The 
controversial aspect of the memo is when Katzenbach says: "the public must be satisfied 
that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still 
at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial." His 
response to that memo before the House Committee was that "it seemed to me that the 
quicker some information could be made available that went beyond what the press was 
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able to uncover and what the press was able to speculate about was desirable in that state 
ofaffairs" (HSCA Hearings, III, 643). How the deputy attorney general of the United 
States could speak with such certitude concerning these issues, when there hadn't even 
been any investigation to speak of, is simply amazing. Another justification he gave was 
that "if that was the conclusion that the FBI was going to come to, then the public had to 
be satisfied that that was the correct conclusion" (HSCA Hearings, III, 652). 
The issue ofthe CIA/Mafia plots to kill Castro emerged, but again, nothing was 
resolved except that we weren't told then, but we know now. Katzenbach, along with 
many others who would testify before the House Committee, stated that irrespective of 
these withholdings by other government institutions, the final result ofthe Warren 
Commission would have been unchanged. He did, however , say that "the conclusions 
might be accurate but the investigation couldn't conceivably be as thorough in that period 
of time as the assassination of a President ought to require" (HSCA Hearings, III, 650). 
The Nosenko affair comes up again, but Mr. Katzenbach doesn't recall having any 
conversation with Mr. Helms of the CIA concerning the defector's fate. Mr. Helms 
claimed that Mr. Katzenbach told him that the CIA' s treatment ofNosenko was legal. 
Mr. Katzenbach said that he hoped he wouldn't have given that kind oflegal advice. 
Beyond this, Mr. Katzenbach added nothing ofany substance to the record. Most of 
what he testified about was discussed at length by other witnesses. 
038: Richard Helms September 22, 1978 
Richard Helms appeared before the Warren Commission with John McCone, then head 
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Helms was the CIA deputy director for plans. 
For those who may go to volume V and read their testimony, do so carefully. The 
wording ofeach question left nothing to chance. In one response, the Commission was 
81 
l 
evaluated in light of the fact that we could not vouch for his bona tides ." 
The inability of former CIA Director Helms to reconcile the Nosenko matter left the 
House Committee not at all reassured about the agency' s official position. "This is the 
issue which remains ... to this very day," Helms testified, "that no person familiar with the 
facts, ofwhom I am aware, finds Mr. Nosenko' s comments about Lee Harvey Oswald and 
the KGB to be credible. That still hangs in the air like an incubus." Helms said that he did 
not know how to resolve "this bone in the throat,'' because he could not say he believed 
Nosenko to be a bona fide defector or that we could rely on what he had said about 
Oswald. "IfMr. Nosenko turned out to be a bona fide defector,'' he said, "if his 
information were to be believed, then we could conclude that the KGB and the Soviet 
Union had nothing to do with President Kennedy's murder. If, on the other hand, Mr. 
Nosenko had been programmed in advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections 
with Oswald, if Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald' s contacts 
with the KGB from 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise that there may have been an 
Oswald-KGB connection in November 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as 
a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy." 
Chairman Preyer spoke for the Committee when, at the conclusion of Richard Helm' s 
testimony, he said: "I think the past two days of testimony have shown the CIA did things 
fifteen years ago or so which shock us, sometimes shock us profoundly. 
Today I heard someone at the luncheon recess conclude from this testimony that 
America is a lawless society because one of our institutions broke the law some years ago. 
Well, this is certainly a lawless society. Russia is a lawless society, where a handful of 
people control things and where you cannot change things unless a revolution or a war 
comes along. 
I think the past few days ' hearings have indicated that we can change things .. . .It is 
impossible to conceive of a KGB agent, for example, ever admitting that anything they did 
fifteen years ago was wrong. 
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The truth about these things, I think, will free up the CIA from past mistakes, and it 
will free all of us." 
039: Dr. Clyde Collins Snow September 25, 1978 
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) charged Dr. Clyde Collins 
Snow, B.S ., Ph.D., Chief, Physical Anthropology Division, Civil Aeromedical Institute of 
the Federal Aviation Administration, a forensic anthropologist, to look at autopsy X-rays, 
to determine whether it was Lee Harvey Oswald or Billy Lovelady in the doorway of the 
TSBD as the Presidential limousine traveled west down Elm Street, to bring to question 
whether Joseph Milteer was on the east side ofHouston street as the Limousine passed on 
its way toward the TSBD, and last of all, to make a judgment on who the three so-called 
tramps are that were arrested that day in Dallas behind the picket fence inside of a railroad 
car. These issues have stirred up controversy over the years within the research 
community. 
Dr. Snow authenticated the X-rays by comparing them with the pre-mortem films 
showing President Kennedy's sinus print - the ridge of bone at the rear of the nose. Since 
the sinus print is as individual as a fingerprint, the autopsy X-rays were those ofPresident 
Kennedy and no one else. 
Dr. Snow subsequently concluded that the person standing in the doorway of the 
TSBD is not Lee Harvey Oswald, but in fact, Billy Lovelady. 
The individual standing on the east side ofHouston street was determined by Dr. Snow 
to be of some unknown individual, not Joseph Milteer, the rabid segregationist from 
Miami, Florida, who had been taped earlier in the month , saying that Kennedy was going 
to be hit, and that it would be done from a building with a high-powered rifle. 
As to the tramps, Dr. Snow spent considerable time demonstrating who the tramps 
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were not. The HSCA anthropologists looked at the photographs and made some 
measurements trying to take into consideration certain differences in the cameras that 
were used, then they made a scientific chart to demonstrate their findings . The 
Rockefeller Commission qualified their conclusion that E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis 
(Watergate burglarers), were not the tramps with the words "as shown in the photographs 
submitted." The HSCA went on to say that in response to a 1975 Newsweek (HSCA 
Hearings, VI, 258) story the CIA conducted "a physiological comparison of the Hunt and 
Sturgis photographs with the tramp photographs." The CIA study reached the same 
conclusion as the Rockefeller Commission. Neither group used a photoanalyst. 
The HSCA concluded that Hunt and Sturgis "were not the tramps" (HSCA Hearings, 
VI, 259). Since Sturgis could not be ruled out on "metric traits" the HSCA had to note 
the following "morphological differences" between Sturgis and the tramp: ' 'Hair-Sturgis is 
a very dark brunette with strongly waved hair; tramp B had medium dark hair with a slight 
wave." Earlier, they admitted that the tramps' outfits "might be a disguise" due to the fact 
that the Hunt tramp looked like "he had been fired from a cannon through a Salvation 
Army Thrift Shop .. . " But they then stated, " ... their footwear seems consistent with their 
classification as vagrants." The next "morphological trait" that rules out Sturgis is his 
"hairline." "The hairline oftramp B shows more bilateral recession than is observed in 
Sturgis." Moving on to Sturgis' nose, "Tramp B has a concave nasal profile with a 
rounded, slightly bulbous, nasal tip. Sturgis' nasal profile is slightly convex and the nasal 
tip is less bulbous than that of the Tramp." What is really being said here is that the two 
noses are quite similar. Both have bulbous tips and although one is concave the other is 
only "slightly convex." Next, the chin - "The most striking difference between the two 
men is the form of the chin. Sturgis' is massive and square; Tramp B has a small and 
rounded chin." 
Sturgis' ears are very important. The HSCA thought the ears of the tramp and Frank's 
were quite similar. But now they point out a dissimilarity - "Tramp B 's ears are 
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considerably more projecting than those of Sturgis which are rather close set. Finally, 
physique. "Tramp B appears to be considerably more linear in body build than Sturgis, 
who is broad and stocky in physique." From the above points the HSCA concludes, 
"Sturgis can be excluded as being Tramp B." 
The HSCA report states, "In comparing Hunt with Tramp C, the average difference of 
the two men is 9.0, (HSCA Hearings, VI, 263) a value significantly high to suggest no 
particularly strong resemblance in facial proportions." The HSCA went on, "In addition, 
in comparing the photographs of the Tramp to those ofHunt taken in the late 1950' s and 
early 1960's, the following morphological differences were noted: Forehead: Tramp C 
has several well-developed transverse frontal sulci and a strong vertical interciliry sulcus. 
These are not observed in Hunt who, even in photographs taken years earlier, has only 
slightly developed transverse frontal and interciliry furrows." 
The report does state that both Hunt and the tramp have the same forehead furrows, 
but the tramp's are more pronounced. This theory is consistent with the HSCA analysis of 
the cheeks ofHunt and the tramp, "Tramp C has well developed nose labial folds whereas 
in Hunt these are only incipiently developed in his photographs taken at about the same 
time as the assassination." The HSCA cites, "In general facial tone, age lines and other 
features, Tramp C appears to be a decade older than Hunt." 
Hunt's nose is examined next, 'The tramp has a relatively broad nose with a bulbous 
fleshy nasal tip. The nasal tip is not depressed. Hunt has a narrow nose with a salient 
nasal bridge and an angular, moderately depressed nasal tip." They said that, "Mouth-
Tramp Chas thick full membranous lips; Hunt is thin lipped." 
At last we get to Hunt ' s ears. "From his photographs, it is apparent that Hunt 
underwent surgery to correct his rather projecting ears. The date of this operation was 
not determined, but from the photographs, it would appear to have been within a few 
years before or after the assassination. In degree of projection, the Tramp' s ears appear to 
more closely match Hunt' s pre-surgical condition." 
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The report continues, "Two features not influenced by the surgery are strongly 
different in the two men. One of these is the helix, the fold of flesh that forms the outer 
rim ofthe ear. In the Tramp, this fold is wide and prominent whereas it is narrower and 
more weakly developed in Hunt. The second difference is in the anti-helix, the secondary 
fold that roughly parallels the helix inside the ear. This structure is strongly developed in 
the Tramp and, in fact, its lower portion appears to extend beyond the helix. In Hunt, the 
anti-helix is weakly developed." 
The last difference regards a scar. "In the tramp there is a pit-like ovid scar about one 
centimeter in diameter located immediately above the lateral end of his right eyebrow. 
This feature is not observed in any ofthe Hunt photographs provided for examination." 
Mr. Fithian ofthe HSCA asked Dr. Snow, "It is my understanding that the CIA and 
FBI conducted their own analyses of the tramp photos that attempt to identify the 
individuals. Did you get into that?" Dr. Snow replied, "We didn' t participate in either of 
those analyses. However, after being called in as consultants to this committee, we were 
furnished copies ofthe reports ofthe CIA and FBI analysis." 
Unfortunately, this is all moot. In February 1992, the Dallas Police Department 
released JFK assassination files that disclosed the identities ofthe three "tramps" 
apprehended in a railroad car. The files names the tramps: John Forrester Gedney, 38, 
Harold Doyle, 32, and Gus Abrams, 53. According to the New York Daily News (March 
4, 1992), Abrams, Doyle, and Gedney were indeed the tramps - actual vagrants - and are 
not considered suspects in the case. The most recent information indicates that these three 
men were held for four days by the Dallas Police Department on vagrancy charges, rather 
than interviewed briefly and released, as was reported previously. According to the FBI, 
Gedney has been located in Melbourne, Florida, where he was interviewed and cleared of 
susp1c10n. 
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040: Dr. Bob R. Hunt September 25, 1978 
Dr. Bob Hunt had a Ph.D. in systems engineering from the University of Arizona. He 
was also an alternate group leader at the University of California' a Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory. 
The task ofDr. Bob Hunt, as a spokesperson for the photographic panel, was to 
evaluate the various pictures and films related to the assassination. He was initially asked 
about three different pieces of film: the Hughes film, the Dillard photograph and the 
Powell photograph. 
The Hughes film was an 8 millimeter film that is 88 frames Jong. It is estimated to have 
been taken and terminate about 5 seconds before the first shot was fired. The importance 
of the film is that it shows the presidential limousine proceeding toward the Texas School 
Book Depository and then turning onto Elm Street. The Dillard photograph was taken 
from a press car just a few seconds after the last shot was fired, according to his testimony 
before the Warren Commission. The Powell photograph was taken about I to 2 minutes 
after the last shot was fired. The issues principally concern themselves with what is visible 
with the sixth floor School Book Depository window (southeast window to be precise). 
In regards to the Hughes film, there was motion detected at the 85th frame, but none 
that is attributable to any human object. The motion, according to the photographic panel, 
was due to "photographic artifacts, namely the change in contrast frame to frame, the 
change in focus as the image of the window moves around in the frame of the film" 
(HSCA Hearings, IV, 404). Dr. Hunt did say, however, that it was very possible that 
there was a human object there, but it would be beyond the perceptibility of the imagery as 
recorded on film. (HSCA Hearings, IV, 404). Adjacent windows were also examined; no 
motion was detected. 
The Dillard photograph yielded no details of a human form or face through the 
enhancement done by the committee. The Powell photograph had the same results. 
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Nothing that was perceptibly human was located on either photograph. 
Dr, Hunt then proceeded to discuss the Nix film (a film taken on the opposite side of 
Elm Street than Abraham Zapruder was on, the south to be exact), the Moorman 
photograph and the Willis photograph. 
He began with the Willis photograph. It had been alleged by some that there was a 
dark object representing a gunman by the retaining wall . Dr. Hunt said that based "upon 
the flesh-tone measurements which we took offof the object at the wall, and comparing 
those to similar measurements on the flesh tones on Zapruder's secretary, we concluded 
this was a person standing at the wall" (HSCA Hearings, IV, 410). When looking at the 
Moorman photograph, which was also taken on the south side ofElm Street, the 
photographic committee concluded there was no evidence of a person that is visible in the 
Willis photograph in the Moorman photograph. The Willis photograph came 
approximately 5 seconds before the Moorman photograph. When the Nix film was 
analyzed in respect to the same figure by the retaining wall, the panel concluded there was 
no flesh tones associated with that region that was also found on Zapruder and his 
secretary. 
The panel concluded by analyzing frame 413 of the Zapruder film . The visibility of a 
head is seen for 18 frames (which would be equivalent to 1 second of time, since the 
Zapruder film ran at 18 frames per second). The conclusion of the Committee was this 
was not a head in the bush, but a man literally standing out near an area of sidewalk in the 
plaza. 
The critics have always felt that more work should be done in regard to these films and 
photographs. The House Committee stands on their record of investigation and analysis. 
041: Louis Steven Witt September 25, 1978 
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About the time that President Kennedy was hit by a bullet, two men standing near each 
other on the north sidewalk ofElm Street acted most strangely - one began pumping a 
black umbrella while the other waved his right arm high in the air. These and subsequent 
actions by this pair aroused the suspicions of researchers over the years, yet the initial 
federal investigation ignored both men. Their activities are known only through analysis 
of assassination photographs. 
As President Kennedy' s limousine began the gentle descent into Dealey Plaza, a man 
can be seen standing near the street-side edge of the Stemmons Freeway sign holding an 
open umbrella. He holds the umbrella in a normal fashion and the top of the umbrella 
almost reaches the bottom of the sign. 
In photos taken minutes before Kennedy' s arrival, the umbrella is closed and, 
immediately after the shooting, pictures show the umbrella was closed again. The man ' s 
umbrella was only open during the shooting sequence. Furthermore, as seen in the 
Zapruder film, once Kennedy is exactly opposite the man with the umbrella, it was 
pumped almost two feet into the air and then lowered. 
At the same time, the second man - in photos he appears to be dark complected, 
perhaps a black man or Hispanic - raised his right hand into the air possibly making a fist . 
This man was located on the outer edge of the Elm Street sidewalk opposite the umbrella 
man, who was on the inner edge. 
The man with the open umbrella was the only person in Dealey Plaza with an open 
umbrella. Under the warm Texas sun, there was no reason to carry an open umbrella at 
that time. 
Two main theories have emerged concerning the "umbrella man" and his activities that 
day. Assassination researcher Robert Cutler has long maintained that the umbrella may 
have been a sophisticated weapon that fired a dart or "flechette" filled with a paralyzing 
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agent. Witt claimed to have no knowledge of what a flechette even was until the night 
before he testified before the House Committee (HSCA Hearings, IV, 437). Cutler' s 
theory is supported by the 1975 testimony of a CIA weapons developer who told the 
Senate Intelligence Committee that just such an umbrella weapon was in the hands of the 
spy agency in 1963 . 
Charles Senseney, who developed weaponry for the CIA at Fort Detrick, Maryland, 
described a dart-firing weapon he developed as looking like an umbrella. He said the dart 
gun was silent in operation and fired through the webbing when the umbrella was open. 
Senseney said the CIA had ordered about fifty such dart weapons and that they were 
operational in 1963 . 
Cutler theorized that the umbrella was used to fire a paralyzing dart into Kennedy 
immobilizing him for marksmen with rifles. He claims this theory accounts for the small 
puncture wound in Kennedy's throat described by Dallas doctors, but which was altered 
by the time of the Bethesda autopsy. According to Cutler, this dart explains Kennedy's 
lack of motion during the shooting sequence. 
Most assassination researchers, however, prefer the alternative theory that both of 
these suspicious men may have been providing visual signals to hidden gunmen. This 
theory suggests that Kennedy was killed by a crossfire coordinated by radiomen. The two 
men, who were among the closest bystanders to the President when he was first struck, 
gave signals indicating that he was not fatally hit and therefore more shots were needed. 
A fascinating twist on this latter theory came from researcher Gary Shaw, who said the 
two men may have been providing Kennedy with a last-second sign of who was 
responsible for his death. Shaw recalled that throughout the planning of the Bay of Pigs 
invasion, CIA officers had promised an "umbrella" of air protection of the Cuban invaders. 
This ' 'umbrella" failed to materialize because Kennedy refused to authorize U.S. military 
support for the invasion. According to Shaw's theory, the man with the open umbrella 
symbolized the promise of an air-support ''umbrella" while the dark-complected man may 
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have been one of the anti-Castro Cuban leaders known to Kennedy. Thus, in the last 
seconds of his life, Kennedy may have seen the open umbrella and the face of a Cuban he 
knew was involved in the Bay of Pigs and realized who was participating in his death. 
But this is all speculation. The existence of the ''umbrella man" and the dark-
complected man is fact. Even their activities after the assassination bear study. While 
virtually everyone in Dealey Plaza was moved to action by the assassination - either falling 
to the ground for cover or moving toward The Grassy Knoll - these two men sat down 
beside each other on the north sidewalk ofElm Street. 
Here the dark-complected man appears to put a walkie-talkie to his mouth. In a 
photograph taken by Jim Towner, what seems to be an antenna can be seen jutting out 
from behind the man' s head while his right hand holds some object to his face. 
Several photos taken in the seconds following the assassination show both of these 
men sitting together on the Elm Street sidewalk. Moments later, the man with the 
umbrella gets up, takes one last look toward the motorcade still passing under the Triple 
Underpass, and begins walking east in the direction of the Depository. The dark-
complected man saunters toward the Triple Underpass passing people rushing up The 
Grassy Knoll. He can be seen stuffing some object into the back ofhis pants. 
Despite the suspicious actions of these two men, there is no evidence that the FBI or 
the Warren Commission made any effort to identify or locate them. Officially they did not 
exist. Yet over the years, this pair became the focal point of criticism by private 
researchers. Researchers claimed the lack of investigation of these men was indicative of 
the shallowness of the government' s handling of the assassination. 
Once the House Select Committee on Assassinations was formed, researchers urged an 
investigation ofboth men. The Committee finally released a photograph of the ' 'umbrella 
Man" to the news media and urged anyone with knowledge of the man to come forward . 
Coincidentally - if it was a coincidence - the "umbrella man" suddenly was identified in 
Dallas a few weeks after this national appeal. In August 1978, a telephone caller told 
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researcher Penn Jones, Jr., that the man with the umbrella was a former Dallas insurance 
salesman named Louis Steven Witt . Jones contacted some local newsmen and together 
they confronted Witt, who then was working as a warehouse manager. Witt refused to 
talk with newsmen but acknowledged that he was in Dealey Plaza on the day President 
Kennedy was killed . 
Jones said that he felt the man had been coached. He would answer no questions and 
pointedly invited them to leave. His only positive statement, which seemed to come very 
quickly, was that he was willing to appear before the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations in Washington. 
Witt indeed appeared before the Committee during its public testimony. His story was 
comic relief compared to the intense scrutiny of witnesses like Marina Oswald and Warren 
Commission critics. His story was facile and improbable and when the umbrella that Witt 
claimed was the same one he had had in Dealey Plaza in 1963 was displayed, it suddenly 
turned wrong-side out, prompting Chairman Stokes to quip: "I guess there is no gun in it" 
(HSCA Hearings, IV, 444). 
Witt told the Committee that on the spur of the moment, he grabbed a large black 
umbrella and went to Dealey Plaza to heckle President Kennedy. He claimed that 
someone had told him that an open umbrella would rile Kennedy. While Witt offered no 
further explanation of how his umbrella could heckle the president, Committee members 
theorized that the umbrella in some way referred to the pro-German sympathies of 
Kennedy' s father while serving as U.S . ambassador to Britain just prior to World War II . 
They said the umbrella may have symbolized the appeasement policies ofBritain' s prime 
minister Neville Chamberlain, who always carried an umbrella. According to Witt : I think 
I went sort of maybe halfway up the grassy area [on the north side ofElm Street] , 
somewhere in that vicinity. I am pretty sure I sat down . .. . [when the motorcade 
appro.ached] I think I got up and started fiddling with that umbrella trying to get it open, 
and at the same time I was walking forward, walking toward the street .... Whereas other 
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people I understand saw the President shot and his movements; I did not see this because 
of this thing [the umbrella] in front of me .. ..My view of the car during that length of time 
was blocked by the umbrella' s being open" (HSCA Hearings, IV, 432-33, 440). 
Based on the available photographs made that day, none ofWitt's statements were an 
accurate account of the actions of the "umbrella man" who stood waiting for the 
motorcade with his umbrella in the normal over-the-head position and then pumped it in 
the air as Kennedy passed. 
Witt's bizarre story - unsubstantiated and totally at variance with the actions of the 
man in the photograph - resulted in few, if any, researchers accepting Louis Steven Witt 
as the "umbrella man." 
And there continues to be no official accounting for the dark-complected man who 
appears to have been talking on a radio moments after the assassination. The House 
Select Committee failed to identify or locate this man and Witt claimed he had no 
recollection of such a person, despite photographs that seem to show the "umbrella man" 
talking with the dark man. 
Witt claimed only to recall that a "Negro man" sat down near him and kept repeating: 
"They done shot them folks" (HSCA Hearings, IV, 434, 441). 
Interestingly, one of the Committee attorneys asked Witt specifically if he recalled 
seeing the man with a walkie-talkie, although officially no one has ever admitted the 
possibility of radios in use in Dealey Plaza. For many, the "umbrella man" and the "dark-
complected man" are still among the mystery people ofDealey Plaza. 
042: Jacqueline Hess September 25, 1978 
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Jacqueline Hess, chief of research, who took over from Donovan Gay, was in charge 
of the mysterious deaths project. She states that this association of people dying 
associated with the Kennedy assassination was raised to national attention by the movie 
"Executive Action. " She incorrectly says that the movie was based on Mark Lane' s book 
"Rush To Judgment ." The movie may take some data from the film, but Mark Lane and 
Dalton Trumbo worked together on the screenplay, some seven years after the publication 
of the book. Ms. Hess cites an advertisement for the movie ' 'Executive Action" which 
"states that an actuary engaged by the London Sunday Times concluded that on 
November 22, the odds against 18 material witnesses being dead within a year period were 
100,000 trillion to 1" (HSCA Hearings, IV, 463). 
On April 27, 1978, the Committee received a copy of the London Sunday Times 
article of February 26, 196 7. The chart in the article states that 19 individuals were used 
as being victims ofmysterious deaths, including Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby. The 
London Times than asked an actuary to compute the life expectancy of 15 of these 
individuals. "The actuary concluded that on November 22, 1963, the odds against all 15 
being dead by February 1976 were about 1 in 10 to the 29th power, or 100,000 trillion to 
l " (HSCA Hearings, IV, 463). 
When the HSCA inquired about the name of the actuary that the London Sunday 
Times consulted, no one in the editorial staff who was involved in the story could 
remember. The HSCA then contacted their own actuarial firms in the District of 
Columbia: Edward H. Friend & Co., Towers Perrin, Forster & Co., and the Wyatt Co. 
They all met to see what the feasibility was of an actuary study being conducted. ''We had 
thus established the impossibility of attempting to establish through the application of 
actuarial principles, any meaningful implications about the existence or absence of a 
conspiracy. Despite the fact that an inference of conspiracy, as here postulated by the 
critics, did not exist, we nevertheless decided not to dismiss the cited deaths out of hand, 
but rather, to look more closely at the nature of certain specific deaths to determine 
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whether or not they could individually be considered mysterious or in some other manner 
a reflection of some sort of conspiracy" (HSCA Hearings, IV, 465-66). 
The HSCA then took these same 19 individuals and added 2 more, Sam Giancana and 
John Roselli. We are not informed as to the rest ofher methods of evaluation, except that 
they tried to get some of the records in the cases. How, we don't know. The alphabetical 
list begins with Edward Benairdes (sic). This is an obvious misspelling; his name is 
Edward Benavides. This is not a conspiracy on the part of the Committee. The rest ofthe 
list is as follows: Albert Guy Bogard, Hale Boggs, Lee Bowers, Jr., Bill Chesher, Nicholas 
J. Chetta, David Goldstein, Thomas Hale Howard, William Hunter, Clyde Johnson, 
Dorothy Kilgallen, Thomas Henry Killam, Jim Koethe, FNU Levens, Nancy Jane Mooney, 
Teresa Norton, Earlene Roberts, Harold Russell, Marilyn April Walle, a.k.a. Betty 
McDonald, William W. Whaley, James R. Worrell, Sam Giancana, John Roselli. The 
Congressional list includes only a small number of those who died mysteriously in the 
case. The Congressional Records of that time indicated that many Congressmen and 
Senators, including the first two chairmen ofthe Committee, were deeply disturbed by the 
murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli (Congressional Record 10,357). 
The final conclusion ofMs. Hess and her staff was that "the available evidence does 
not establish anything about the nature of these deaths which would indicate that the 
deaths were in some manner, either direct or peripheral, caused by the assassination of 
President Kennedy or by any aspect of the subsequent investigation " (HSCA Hearings, 
IV, 467). 
She further emphasized, when asked by Mr. Fithian, that any statistical inference was 
not able to be established because of the inability of specificity, the universe that these 
people existed in, categories into which those individuals who mysteriously died, fell . Age, 
sex, race, occupation, geographical location, and any other factors that would contribute 
to actuarial mortality rates were also considered. 
When asked why the death ofMr. George DeMohrenschildt was not included in her 
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study, she said his was one that deemed further investigation. She used DeMohrenschildt 
in terms of compilation ofdata, but in terms of a subsequent investigation--that was done 
by the investigators. George DeMohrenschildt died ofa gunshot wound the day a 
committee investigator located him. Critic and assassination researcher Edward Jay 
Epstein had an interview scheduled with him that day. One wonders why people like 
Buddy Walthers and Roger Craig weren' t mentioned. 
043: Earl Ruby September 26, 1978 
Earl Ruby was called before the Warren Commission on June 3, 1964. For reasons 
totally unfathomable, was called to Washington to testify, ahead ofhis brother Jack, who 
was required to testify from a Dallas jail. 
Before the Commission, Jack Ruby' s brother read a statement into the record: ''My 
brother, Jack, was deprived, and is presently being deprived, ofhis constitutional and civil 
rights. The hatred and bigotry in Dallas, Texas, resulted in the assassination ofour 
President. It almost cost the lives of our present President, Mr. Johnson, and others" (WC 
Hearings, IV, 413). That statement hardly sounded like an accusation against Oswald, yet 
in the remaining 17 pages ofhis testimony, his references to Dallas bigotry and hatred 
were ignored. Also, there were no questions as to any conversations on the assassination 
weekend between the witness and his brother. Instead, the Commission focused on the 
witness's adoptive parents at age 6, and how kosher the meals were. What wasn't kosher 
was the Commission' s "desire for truth." 
Earl Ruby added nothing further to the record that hadn' t been stated in his testimony 
before the Warren Commission. 
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044: Capt. Jack Revill September 26, 1978 
Jack Revill, a Dallas Police Department lieutenant, and detective, returned from the 
Texas School Book Depository on November 22 at about 2:50 pm only to be met by FBI 
Special Agent James Hosty, who allegedly reported, "Jack, a Communist killed President 
Kennedy. Lee Oswald killed President Kennedy. He is in our Communist file . We knew 
he was here in Dallas. We had information that this man was capable-" (WC Hearings, 
V, 34-5). 
When Revill testified before the Warren Commission in Dallas during the month of 
March, it was a very pleasant proceeding. He indicated that he had been put in charge of 
the investigation ofRuby' s shooting of Oswald, clearly showing he was a trusted officer 
(WC Hearings, XII, 74). 
Between his two appearances on March 31 and May 13, 1964, before the Warren 
Commission, a report dated November 22 surfaced, indicating that Revill and Hosty, 
overheard by Detective Brian, had the above-cited conversation. And the WC wanted no 
part of it . They did everything possible to rattle the witness's cage, but Revill maintained 
the beliefs that he put in the report that went to Captain Gannaway. The question 
remained open, but it suggests that the FBI may have had more knowledge than they let 
on, and it is also curious that the Commission would bring Revill to DC to report one 
conversation, while Jack Ruby pleaded to get the same trip with possibly better 
information, and was refused. 
Revill also noted that 4 or 5 picketers at the Trade Mart (possibly holdovers from the 
Stevenson incident) were taken into custody after the assassination for their own 
protection: "I am afraid they would have been mobbed" (WC Hearings, V, 36). Revill 
also indicated he learned much about Oswald' s arrest from FBI agent Robert Barrett, a 
ubiquitous individual about whom the WC had very little curiosity (WC Hearings, V, 40). 
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Jack Revill added nothing further to the record that hadn't been stated in his testimony 
before the Warren Commission. 
045: Lewis McWillie September 27, 1978 
In mid-1959, the Rothman gun-running operation was rocked when its chief was 
arrested in connection with an $8.5 million Canadian bank burglary. Federal authorities 
linked the bank job with a large theft ofarms from an Ohio National Guard armory 
through a $6,000 airplane rental agreement by Rothman. Authorities agreed it appeared 
to all be part of a massive gun-running operation to Cuba. It was during this time that 
Jack Ruby's travels to Cuba increased significantly, thanks to Ruby's mob idol, Lewis 
McWillie. Mc Willie was essentially brought in to testify in order to link Ruby to the 
Mafia. 
McWillie-potentially a key central character in this swirl of gun-running, drug 
smugglers, mob hitmen, CIA-Mafia assassination plots and Texas gamblers-has received 
scant attention from the two major government assassination investigations. 
In his Warren Commission testimony, Ruby made no secret of his closeness to 
Mc Willie. He said: "I called him frequently .. . I idolized Mc Willie. He is a pretty nice boy 
and I happened to be idolizing him . . . .I always thought a lot of him ... I have a great 
fondness for him . .. . " 
The Warren Report mentioned McWillie only briefly, regarding Ruby's 1959 visit to 
Cuba, and concluded: "The Commission has found no evidence that McWillie has 
engaged in any activities since leaving Cuba that are related to pro- or anti-Castro political 
movements or that he was involved in Ruby' s abortive jeep transactions. " 
While the Warren Commission took Ruby and McWillie's word that the 1959 trips to 
Cuba were "purely social," the House Select Committee on Assassinations did not. After 
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listing a number of visits to Cuba based on visas, airline tickets, and even a postcard, Chief 
Counsel Blakey wrote: " . .. we established beyond reasonable doubt that Ruby lied 
repeatedly and willfully to the FBI and the Warren Commission about the number of trips 
he made to Cuba and their duration ... .It was clear, for example, that the trips were not 
social jaunts; their purpose, we were persuaded, was to courier something, probably 
money, into or out of Cuba.. . the evidence indicated strongly that an association [with 
Trafficante] existed and that Ruby' s trip was related to Trafficante' s detention and release. 
We came to believe that Ruby's trips to Cuba were, in fact, organized-crime activities." 
Lewis J. McWillie was born on May 4, 1908, in Kansas City, Missouri . From 1940 
until 1958, he lived in Dallas where he managed several gambling operations, including 
Benny Binion' s legendary Top of the Hill Terrace and the Four Deuces in nearby Fort 
Worth owned by gentleman gambler W.C. Kirkwood. [Recall it was his son, Pat 
Kirkwood, who hosted Kennedy' s Secret Service agents the night before the 
assassination.] 
By September 1958, McWillie was manager of the Tropicana Hotel ' s luxurious casino, 
then styled as "the largest nightclub in the world." It was here that McWillie became a 
close associate of some of the mob's most powerful leaders. According to a March 26, 
1964, FBI memo prepared for the Warren Commission: " ... it would appear McWillie 
solidified his Syndicate connections through his association in Havana with Santos 
Trafficante, well-known Syndicate member, for Tampa, Florida; Meyer and Jake Lansky; 
Dino Cellini and others who were members of or associates of "the Syndicate." 
When Castro closed the Tropicana, McWillie became pit boss at the Capri Hotel ' s 
casino, another Trafficante property. The Capri was then run by Charlie "The Blade" 
Tourine, whose mistress later confirmed that she was assisting Frank Sturgis in an attempt 
to poison Castro. McWillie finally left Cuba in January 1961 . According to Ruby and 
others, he was one of the last American mobsters to leave the island. 
Although during testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 
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Trafficante plainly stated, "I never remember meeting Jack Ruby," the Committee 
concluded there was considerable evidence that such a meeting did take place. 
But these connections, especially in light of the current theory ofmob involvement in 
the assassination, certainly elevate Ruby far above the simple, emotional nightclub owner 
pictured by the Warren Commission. The House Committee' s chief counsel Robert 
Blakey, commenting on Ruby' s connections with both mobsters and Cuba, wrote: "Our 
conclusion about Ruby in Cuba did not necessarily mean organized crime had a hand in the 
events in Dallas in 1963, but it did shift the balance in the careful process ofweighing the 
evidence." 
The background of Jack Ruby is laced with mob associates and contacts, including 
Lewis McWillie, that lasted right up to the eve ofthe Kennedy assassination. Obviously 
Jack Ruby was much more than simply an overwrought nightclub owner who shot Lee 
Harvey Oswald to save Mrs. Kennedy the trauma ofreturning to Dallas to testify at 
Oswald's trial. 
046: Jose Aleman September 27, 1978 
On March 12, 1977, four days before the committee' s first interview with Santos 
Trafficante, committee investigator Gaeton Fonzi, interviewed Jose Aleman, the wealthy 
Cuban exile who had alleged to the FBI in the fall of 1962 that Trafficante had told him 
President Kennedy "was going to be hit." During the interview, held in secret session, 
Aleman expanded considerably on the original allegation he had made to the FBI in the fall 
of 1962 and had repeated the day after the assassination. He told the Assassinations 
Committee that during his conversation with Trafficante, the Florida boss had said that 
Kennedy would "get what is coming to him" as a result ofhis administration' s intense 
efforts to prosecute Hoffa. Aleman then went on to tell the committee that T rafficante 
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had made it quite clear to him that he was not guessing that the President was going to be 
killed. Rather he did, in fact, know that such a crime was being planned. According to 
the Assassinations Committee's final report, Aleman further stated that Trafficante had 
given him the distinct impression that Hoffa was to be principally involved in planning the 
presidential murder. 
A little over a year later Aleman was called to testify before the House Select 
Committee on Assassinations again, this time in public session. Prior to his appearance 
before the committee, Aleman reaffirmed his original account of his September 1962 
meeting with Trafficante, but then, just his appearance in public session, he told members 
of the committee staff that he feared for his physical safety and was afraid of possible 
reprisal from Trafficante or his organization. Then, when he took the stand, he repeated 
under oath that Trafficante had said Kennedy "was going to be hit" but hedged his remark 
by saying that Trafficante may have only meant the President was going to be hit by "a lot 
ofRepublican votes" (HSCA Hearings, V, 305) in the 1964 election, not that he was 
going to be assassinated. 
When Trafficante himself appeared before the committee for the second time, on 
September 28, 1978, he admitted, in his immunized testimony, that he had conspired with 
the CIA to kill Fidel Castro but "denied any foreknowledge of, or of participation in, the 
President's murder." 
Five years later. A penniless and despondent Jose Aleman, wholly convinced the Mafia 
was out to get him, committed suicide after killing his 69 year old aunt and seriously 
wounding three cousins, one of whom was only 6 years old, and wounding as well four 
SWAT team officers ofthe Miami Police. 
Aleman, the only son of a wealthy former minister of education in pre-Batista Cuba, 
had lost a fortune estimated to have once been worth around $30 million. (His 
investments had included the Miami Stadium, the huge Cape Florida development in Key 
Biscayne, and several luxury hotels in Miami.) Aleman had become convinced that his 
102 
1978 congressional testimony against Santos Trafficante had ultimately caused his 
financial ruin and had marked him and his family for the rest of their lives. 
Tormented by these thoughts, Aleman went beserk as soon as he woke up on the 
morning of August 1, 1983, and, in a wild rampage, opened fire on everyone in his house 
and then, after the SWAT team arrived and he had exchanged fire with them, shot himself 
in the temple, dying instantly. 
Aleman's surviving relatives later told the press that he had been consumed with fear 
because of his 1978 testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 
which he stated that Santos Trafficante had told him in 1962 that "President John F. 
Kennedy would not get reelected in 1964, and that he was going to get hit. " From that 
day on he believed he and his family were on a Mafia hit list. 
047: Santos Trafficante September 28, 1978 
Santos Trafficante was a purported Mafia boss who was based in Tampa, Florida. 
During a 30-year span, including the time of the assassination, Trafficante controlled mob 
operations in Cuba before Castro' s revolution and maintained close ties to the paramilitary 
Cuban exiles. He died in 1987. 
On January 14, 1992, Jack Newfield of the New York Post quoted Frank Ragano, 
Trafficante' s lawyer of27 years, as saying that Jimmy Hoffa had sent him to New Orleans 
to instruct Trafficante and New Orleans mob boss Carlos Marcello to kill the president. 
The HSCA reported that: "Trafficante, like [assassination suspect Carlos] Marcello, had 
the motive, means and opportunity to assassinate President Kennedy . .. Trafficante was a 
key subject of the Justice Department crackdown on organized crime during the Kennedy 
administration, with his name being added to a list of the top 10 syndicate leaders targeted 
for investigation. [RFK' s] strong interest in having Trafficante prosecuted occurred 
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during the same period in which CIA officials, unbeknown.st to the Attorney General, were 
using Trafficante' s services in assassination plots against ... Fidel Castro. 
The committee found that ... Trafficante' s stature in the national syndicate of organized 
crime, notably the violent narcotics trade, and his role as the mob ' s chief liaison to 
criminal figures within the Cuban exile community, provided him with the capability of 
formulating an assassination conspiracy against President Kennedy. Trafficante had 
recruited Cuban nationals to help plan and execute the CIA' s assignment to assassinate 
Castro." (The CIA gave the assignment to former FBI agent Robert Maheu, who passed 
the contract along to Mafia figures Sam Giancana and John Roselli. They, in turn, enlisted 
Trafficante to have the intended assassination carried out.) 
Trafficante admitted to his role in the plot to kill Castro during his HSCA testimony. 
In his September 28, 1978, HSCA testimony, however, he "categorically denied ever 
having discussed any plans to assassinate President Kennedy." 
Regarding Trafficante's association with Jack Ruby, the HSCA reports: ''Ruby may 
have met Trafficante at Trescornia prison in Cuba during one of his visits to Havana in 
1959, as the CIA had learned but had discounted in 1964. While the committee was not 
able to determine the purpose of the meeting, there was considerable evidence that it did 
take place." 
On November 28, 1963, the CIA sent a copy of a memo to LBJ aide McGeorge 
Bundy, stating that, in 1959, Trafficante had been visited by Ruby in jail in Cuba. A July 
21 , 1961, Treasury Department memo made public in 1976 stated that there were 
"unconfirmed rumors in the Cuban refugee population in Miami that when Fidel Castro 
ran the American racketeers out of Cuba and seized the casinos, he kept ... Trafficante . .. in 
jail to make it appear he had a personal dislike for Trafficante, when in fact Trafficante is 
an agent of Castro. Trafficante is allegedly Castro ' s outlet for illegal contraband in this 
country." 
Trafficante basically told the House Committee nothing that they already didn' t know. 
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He admitted to the attempted assassination plots of the CIA to kill Castro, but they 
already knew about those. If the Committee was trying to get anything from Trafficante, 
they were sorely disappointed. 
048: Ralph Salerno September 28, ' 1978 
Ralph Salemo was a retired organized crime expert of the New York City Police 
Department, who had a reputation of knowing more about the Mafia than any other 
nonmember. Salemo was brought in to put Ruby' s ties to the Mafia in perspective. 
He gave a brief characterization of this criminal organization in his testimony before the 
House Committee: There is a national conspiratorial criminal organization within the 
United States whose members refer to themselves as La Cosa Nostra. The organization is 
made up ofgroups known to the members as families. The families are headed by a leader 
who is referred to as a boss or the Italian word capo is used. The families have a second 
in command, executive officer to the leader, who is referred to as the underboss, and they 
use the Italian word sottocapo. 
The families have a position known as counselor, or they use the Italian word 
consigliere, who is considered to be an adviser and who is available to all of the members 
of the family. 
The family has within it subunits, known originally as Decina . . .. The subunits are 
headed by a person with a title of caporegime, or the head of the regime. This position is 
often referred to in the anglicized word captain. The individual members of the family are 
referred to as members, soldiers, or as a made man or as a button man. 
The families are governed in matters of import of policy and in matters arising between 
families by the national commission whose numbers can vary, which is made up of the 
leaders of the major families . Those families whose leaders do not serve on the 
105 
commission may have their interests represented by a commission member. 
Other terms for the organization or its individual families, often used by outsiders, are 
the Mafia, the organization, the clique, the boys, the office, the arm. (HSCA Hearings, V, 
427-28). 
A final comment is in order concerning the Italian origins of the Mafia-as noted by 
Ralph Salerno, himself of Italian descent. The Mafia is an aberration that victimized those 
of its own extraction before migrating to other domains. The preposterous notion that its 
frank discussion slights Italians has been promoted almost exclusively by Mafia members 
themselves. 
Salerno was not brought in to tie Ruby to the Mafia, only to put the nature of the 
Mafia in its correct and precise perspective. 
049: Judge Burt W. Griffin September 28, 1978 
Burt Griffin was a junior counsel with the Warren Commission and was brought before 
the committee to explain the machinations of that commission that he had served. 
Mr. Griffin started his testimony by saying that the real questions for the House 
Committee should be toward the future. In other words, rather than attempting to reach a 
conclusion as to how President Kennedy happened to be killed and why and who may 
have participated, the real questions are for the future. After reading the testimony of 
Ford, Cooper, and McCloy, Mr. Griffin adds nothing to the record that we don' t already 
know. His position, like the other members of the Commission, has not changed one iota. 
He did enumerate certain failures of the Warren Commission, but nothing that would at 
all alter the final verdict of the Commission. This ofcourse is why he stated at the outset 
that the purpose of the Committee should look to the future to try and prevent those 
failures from ever occurring again, in the event ofanother political assassination in this 
country. Another reason is that Mr. Griffin believes the Warren Commission solved the 
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case 14 years prior to the emergence of the House Committee. The House Committee 
would see things a little differently than Mr. Griffin. They would find a "probable 
conspiracy" in the probe to find the truth about the assassination ofPresident Kennedy. 
050: Dr. Mark Weiss December 29, 1978 (w/Dr. E. Aschkenasy, H.B. McLain) 
One can easily imagine the Committee's astonishment when it heard Dr. James Barger's 
testimony concerning the Dallas police tape (dictabelt). The medical, ballistics, and other 
scientific evidence clearly pointed to a lone assassin firing from the rear. Now, Barger 
raised the distinct possibility of shots fired from the front and rear. Ifthat turned out to be 
the case, then at least two assassins must have shot at the president. The press had largely 
downplayed the acoustics analysis because Barger had hedged his testimony, saying that it 
was only a 50-50 probability there was a fourth shot. The 50-50 probability came from 
the fact that the position of the motorcycle had only been estimated within eighteen feet. 
To refine Barger's analysis, the committee hired acoustics expert Mark Weiss ofQueens 
College of the City University ofNew York and his research associate, Ernest 
Aschkenasy. The committee charged Weiss and Aschkenasy with determining whether or 
not a shot was indeed fired from the grassy knoll (HSCA Report 72). 
Using a precise scale plot map ofDealey Plaza, Weiss and Aschkenasy computed the 
type of impulses that a Grassy Knoll shot would have caused. Then they carefully 
examined the Dallas police tape to search for such impulses. They found an impulse 
sequence on the tape that matched their calculations to within 1I1 , 000 ofa second. The 
precision of the match was so great that they concluded that there was a 95 percent 
probability of a shot's being fired from the grassy knoll, a probability so strong that it ruled 
out random tape noise and other possible causes for the impulses on the tape. Weiss and 
Aschkenasy testified that their acoustical analysis proved beyond any reasonable doubt 
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that a supersonic bullet was fired at the presidential limousine from the grassy knoll 
(HSCA Hearings, V, 556). 
Weiss and Aschkenasy testified for several hours-explaining their charts and 
diagrams, saying that the analysis was simple to understand, that it could be ''understood 
by anybody who has ever heard an echo" (HSCA Hearings, V, 588). 
Some of the congressmen resisted. Congressman Edgar asked: ''Dr. Weiss, are you 
aware of the phenomenon that exists out on the open sea when ships are trying to locate 
the port and they hear a foghorn in the distance? Are you aware ... that occasionally the 
sound from that foghorn directs the ship in a false direction, as opposed to the accurate 
direction of seeking a safe harbor, and in fact in some instances those ships wind up on the 
rocks and go in exactly the opposite direction ofwhere they should go?' 
The metaphor was clear. Dr. Weiss answered simply, ''No, sir, I am not," (HSCA 
Hearings, V, 609) and the audience exploded with laughter and applause. 
The experts had tested the tape against Dealey Plaza with only two assumed shooter 
locations. With more extensive tests, it could well be that other information on the tape 
might represent the sounds of additional shots. Blakey himself said to more than one 
researcher that there might be more than four shots on the tape, but he treated that 
statement as an "investigative hypothesis." I thought it was a good one. 
The acoustical studies by Weiss and Aschkenasy, reviewed and supported by Barger, 
convinced a majority of the committee members that the assassination of John Kennedy 
resulted from a conspiracy. Having established the high probability of a conspiracy, the 
committee sought to identify its nature and the individuals involved in it. 
051: Dr. Ernest Aschkenasy December 29, 1978 (w/Dr. M. Weiss, H.B. McLain) 
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The testimony of Dr. Aschkenasy and Dr. Weiss are virtually the same, as they worked 
together and came to the exact same conclusions. There was no disagreement between 
these two scientists. 
052: H. B. McLain December 29, 1978 (w/Dr. M. Weiss, Dr. E. Aschkenasy) 
Officer H.B. McLain was riding a motorcycle 352 to the left rear of the presidential 
limousine. On Friday, December 29, 1978, the House Committee met in a crowded caucus 
room of the Cannon House Office Building for its final public hearing, which was covered 
by live television. The HSCA first reviewed the witness testimony as to the number, 
interval, and origin of the shots that the Warren Commission had rejected as not credible. 
They then called Weiss, Aschkenasy, H.B. McLain (still a Dallas police officer), and 
Barger. 
Weiss and Aschkenasy reviewed their work. They had become involved at first only to 
review Barger's proposed test in Dallas in August. After Barger's September testimony, 
they had been asked to try to move the uncertainty off center either way. They started 
their work in October and finished in late December. The result was "a probability of 95 
percent or better that there was indeed a shot fired from the grassy knoll. They were able 
to place the shooter within a five-foot circumference. They could pinpoint the location of 
the microphone to within a foot and a half They knew that the weapon had fired a 
supersonic bullet, since a shock wave had preceded the sound of the muzzle blast (they 
could detect both phenomena on the tape) . The weapon could have been a rifle or a 
pistol, since either could fire supersonic ammunition. They explained how they knew the 
microphone had been shielded at various points by the windshield of the motorcycle. In 
their calculations, they had made allowances for possible small error on the scale map they 
had used (less than one foot); air-temperature and humidity variances; and the 
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characteristics ofthe type of radio equipment used by the Dallas police in 1963. They had 
double-checked their calculations, and, yes, they were satisfied with their conclusions 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the scientific principles they had employed were 
little more then high school physics and geometry. Anyone who had heard an echo could 
understand what was involved, so they claimed. The sound, supposedly, could not have 
been a motorcycle backfire since it was preceded by the supersonic shock wave. In any 
event, there was no motorcycle behind the picket fence. Obviously, the bell tolling on the 
tape had come from somewhere other than Dealey Plaza. Could the sound have come 
from a different area? Only if the other area were an exact acoustical replica ofDealey 
Plaza, and the shots had been fired there too. "Ifsomebody were to tell me that the 
motorcycle was not in Dealey Plaza," Aschkenasy noted, "[that] he was transmitting from 
some other location, .. .I would ask to be told where that location is, .. .I would go there, 
and, .. .I would expect to find a replica ofDealy Plaza ... " The shot had not been fired up 
in the air, they said, but at the presidential limousine. No, according to Weiss and 
Aschkenasy, the sound ofthe grassy knoll could not have been an acoustical mirage. The 
distance was too short, and the sequence ofechoes was inconsistent with a mirage. The 
conclusion was, they said, inescapable; it was not a matter of interpretation; there didn't 
seem to be any way to make those numbers go away, no matter how hard they tried. 
Officer McLain appeared next. He recognized himself on his motorcycle in the 
photographs showing him at the right time and place. But he said that he had heard only 
one shot. (He had said two in an earlier interview.) His radio was normally on Channel 
One, but he had no memory of using it that day. McLain could not testify that it was his 
microphone that had stuck because he did not remember, but it was a common problem 
with his equipment. After the shots were fired, the presidential limousine took off for the 
hospital. McLain left too, but he did not catch the limousine until it was on Stemmons 
Freeway. (Back in Dallas after the hearing, McLain told a CBS newsman that he believed 
it was not his microphone that had recorded the sounds. He cited the sound of sirens on 
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the tape, saying he believed he had turned his siren on while he was still in Dealey Plaza. 
Ultimately, the Committee decided that the tape, not McLain ' s memory, was correct. ) 
Barger rounded out the testimony for the day. He told how the pattern of sound 
(muzzle blast and echo) received by the microphone for each rifle location was unique. 
He described how he was able to determine that the microphone was to the left and to the 
rear of the presidential limousine, where the photographs ultimately placed McLain. He 
explained the sound of the sirens on the tape (that had troubled McLain). While McLain' s 
motorcycle was running, his radio microphone could not pick up any siren more than three 
hundred feet away. The evidence indicated that McLain did not tum on his siren right 
away, and he did not catch up with the other vehicles in the motorcade, whose sirens were 
sounding, until he reached Stemmons Freeway. (The necessary implication ofBarger' s 
testimony was that if McLain remembered that he had turned on his siren immediately, the 
tape indicated he was mistaken.) Barger noted that there was no evidence on the tape of a 
supersonic shock wave accompanying the first two shots, even though the ballistic tests 
indicated Oswald ' s rifle fired supersonic ammunition. This was so, he explained, because 
McLain's motorcycle at the time of the first two shots was outside the area where the 
shock wave would have been picked up by his microphone. At the time of the third and 
fourth shots, McLain was in a position to have picked up the shock waves, and they did 
appear on the tape. Barger repeated his statistical analysis of the confidence level -- 95 
percent or better -- and then added, in plain language, that he was quite confident he had 
measured gunshots. 
The House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded the hearing by showing the 
Zapruder film with the tape-recorded sounds of shots from the Barger reconstruction in 
August 1978 dubbed in at the points in time when they were fired on November 22, 1963 . 
It was as if everyone had returned to Dealey Plaza to hear, as well as see, the 
assassination. The effect, even viewed on videotape, is awesome. The hearings had 
begun with Governor and Mrs. Connally testifying to what they remembered; the hearings 
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ended with a demonstration of what modem science had allegedly proven. The 
Committee came to historic conclusions. It had reviewed the evidence ofwhat had 
occurred on November 22, 1963, principally as it had been developed by the scientific 
projects in the fields of photography, forensic pathology and dentistry, ballistics, neutron 
activation analysis, and acoustics. There was a seemingly coherent and compelling 
scenario of the basic facts of the assassination. 
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CONCLUSION 
On February 19, 1975, Representative Henry Gonzalez of Texas introduced a bill 
calling for a Congressional investigation into the deaths of John and Robert Kennedy, and 
Dr. Martin Luther King. Gonzalez was further inspired by the revelation of the Church 
Committee Report. The first public showing of the Zapruder film on national television, in 
1975, also added public pressure. Finally, on October 17, 1976, the House of 
representatives approved the bill, and appointed its own Select Committee on 
Assassinations to probe domestic assassinations in the same manner the Church 
Committee had explored plots against foreign leaders. 
Those who had pursued the JFK assassination trail for years felt vindicated. The 
government was reopening the case; the Warren Report was now officially deemed 
inadequate. 
But the Select Committee ran into controversy right out of the gate--when it named 
attorney Richard A Sprague as its chief counsel. This appointment caused great alarm in 
the critical community. In Philadelphia, Sprague had served as first assistant to Arlen 
Specter, developer of the single bullet theory. Sprague wasn't the problem, however. 
Internal bickering over procedural matters and the direction the investigation was to take 
almost derailed the whole project. It wasn't until Rep. Lewis Stokes of Ohio was selected 
as the new chairman, and law professor G. Robert Blakey replaced Sprague that work 
finally got underway. Critics credit the Congressional Black Caucus with supplying the 
political muscle that finally got the new investigation offthe ground. 
Regular closed-door.meetings began in the summer of 1977. By September, 1978, the 
committee was prepared for public hearings on the JFK murder. On July 29, 1979, the 
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House Select Committee on Assassinations published its final report. The primary 
conclusions were as follows: 
The Warren Commission had been almost entirely correct in its original reconstruction 
of the actual assassination. The House Committee had employed a battery of scientists to 
examine each controversial aspect of the Warren Report, and the results of these new tests 
persuaded the majority of committee members that the Commission had been correct on 
almost each point. 
Lee Harvey Oswald had fired three shots at President Kennedy, and one of those 
bullets had passed through the President to wound Governor Connally. Arlen Specter had 
been correct. The "magic bullet" theory was substantiated. 
Where the Warren Commission had gone wrong--through no fault of its own, the 
Committee stated--was on the matter of a fourth bullet. Based on acoustical evidence 
which the Committee had uncovered--a microphone on one of the police escort 
motorcycles had been left open, producing a dictabelt recording of the actual shooting--
the House Committee concluded that a second assassin had fired a fourth shot from the 
back of the grassy knoll. The President of the United States had in fact been killed by a 
conspiracy involving at least two shooters, the Select Committee announced. 
The identity of this second gunman remained a mystery, however. In a carefully 
worded statement, the committee said that the available evidence did not "preclude the 
possibility" that individual members ofcertain anti-Castro groups, or individual members 
ofthe Mob may have been involved. The Committee, however, did rule out the possibility 
that either Oswald, or his unknown associate, had been working on instructions from 
either Castro, or the KGB. 
Turning the entire Report over to the Justice Department, the committee urged Justice 
to take a new and hard look at the two leading suspects behind the Kennedy assassination: 
Santos Trafficante and Carlos Marcello. 
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In what would become one of its most hotly-contested conclusions, the House 
Committee also rules out the possibility that nay official agencies--from the Dallas police 
to the CIA--had played any active role in the murder. 
What is truly fascinating is how precious little attention was paid to this Report in the 
public press. The Ne"»1 York Times was derisive and sly in its response. "To the lay 
public," the Times editorialized on January 7, 1979, "the word [conspiracy] is [usually] 
freighted with dark connotations ofmalevolence perpetrated by enemies, foreign and 
political. But [in this instance] 'two maniacs instead ofone' might be more like it." 
The Washington Post was derisive and angry, suggesting what the Justice Department 
might now do with the bombshell that had been placed on its desk. "The finding," the 
Post editorialized on January 6, 1979, "appears to be based solely on scientific, acoustical 
evidence. All that is left is a theory to conspiracy stripped of the international or domestic 
intrigue on which many of the Warren Commission critics have focused .. . There seems 
little reason for the Justice Department to use its resources exploring the dead ends and 
pursuing the cold trails that the committee is presenting it in the Kennedy case ...Leave the 
matter where it now rests: as one ofhistory's most agonizing unresolved mysteries." The 
next day, Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen added: "This is ... a conspiracy 
between Lee Harvey Oswald and someone like him--Oswald Harvey Lee. Make up a 
name. It's a clone of the same man." 
How the House Select Committee discovered a fourth shot, and a second assassin, is a 
story worth telling in more detail. On Saturday morning, September 17, 1977, Professor 
Robert Blakey, the newly appointed Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations, hosted a rather unusual meeting in Room 3618 of the House Annex No. 2 
Building in Washington, D.C. Joining Blakey in private conference that morning were 
nine of the Warren Report's most persistent critics. Josiah Thompson, Paul Hoch, and 
Peter Dale Scott had flown in from California. Larry Harris, J. Gary Shaw and Mary 
Ferrell had come up from Dallas. Sylvia Meagher had arrived from New York City. And 
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Jim Kostman and Kathy Kinsella had joined the rest of their c.olleagues from the newly 
formed Assassination Information Bureau in D.C. The "Buffs" were being made welcome 
at last at the Capitol. 
The first day belonged almost entirely to the critics. Blakey asked the critics to tell him 
where they would recommend he focus the new investigation and the critics most happily 
complied. At the end of the first day, Mary Ferrell, the Dallas-based critic whose research 
abilities are considered legend by her colleagues, turned over to Blakey a copy of a Dallas 
police department dispatch tape which she suggested he might want to hear. The 
microphone of one of the escort police motorcycles had been left on, and at the exact 
moment of the assassination, the dispatch tape recorded the sounds of the shooting. 
Listen very closely, Ferrell told Blakey, and I think you will hear at least four shots. 
Blakey realized instantly, of course, what Ferrell was telling him. Using a Mannlicher-
Carcano rifle, a lone gunman would only have had time to get off three shots--three, and 
three only. A fourth shot would require a second gunman. A fourth shot, in short, would 
. .
require conspiracy. 
Blakey had no recourse but to take Mary Ferrell's tape quite seriously. The chief 
counsel's first job was to find the original of this tape. In short order, the tape was found 
in the possession ofPaul McCaghren, a retired officer who had formerly headed up the 
Intelligence wing of the Dallas Police Department. McCaghren had removed the tape 
from the department for fear it might get lost. The tape, and its supporting materials, 
were logged in as a part of the Committee's files. 
Blakey's next step was to seek an independent, preliminary analysis of the contents. He 
sent the tape to Dr. James Barger, of the firm Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., located in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. BBN was the firm chosen by Judge John Sirica to examine 
the infamous "18 minute gap" tape during the Watergate case. Blakey requested that 
Barger first determine if any gunshots at all had been recorded. 
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On July 13, 1978, Dr. Barger called the Chief Counsel in Washington. The scientist 
said he felt a little sick to his stomach, and strangely embarrassed. Upon analysis, he was 
forced to report that the tape had recorded the sounds of three to five gunshots. Based on 
this finding, Barger would now recommend further and more elaborate tests. 
On August 20, Blakey and Barger met in Dealey Plaza to attempt an acoustical 
reconstruction of the shootings. As Blakey would later write in his book, The Plot to Kill 
the President, " for five hours, Barger, his staff and ours, and the Dallas police, 
orchestrated a slow drum roll of fifty-seven gunshots that broke the still of the morning, 
each slamming harmlessly into sandbags and echoing into an array of microphones spotted 
along the path of the 1963 motorcade." Care was taken to insure that the acoustic 
environment was identical to the circumstances which had prevailed at noontime on Nov. 
22, 1963 . 
Less than a month later, on Sept. 12, 1978, Dr. Barger appeared before the House 
Committee to discuss his findings . Based on 2,592 calculations, involving 432 
combinations of rifle shots and microphone locations, he was now prepared to state that 
four shots had rung out that noontime in Dallas. Moreover, with a probability factor of 
87.5%, three of those shots had been fired from the general direction of the Texas School 
Book Depository. With a probability factor of only 50%, a fourth shot had likely been 
fired from the grassy knoll. Blakey realized immediately that this was not enough. "We 
had reached the goal line," he would later write, "but we had not scored." 
Blakey then went in search ofa second opinion. With Barger's help, he turned the 
evidence over to computer scientists Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy in New York. 
The two scientists then developed acoustic "fingerprints" for the grassy knoll shot. On 
December 18, 1978, Blakey was able to present the full committee the results of tests 
conducted by Drs. Weiss and Aschkenasy. Like Barger before them, the two men also felt 
queasy about what they had found . 
.......__ 
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The grassy knoll shot was there all right. From its fingerprint, the scientists were able 
to deduce within a margin of error of plus or minus one and a half feet the exact location 
of the microphone which had recorded the shot. This location corresponded exactly to 
where the Dallas police had at the time already located the motorcycle in question. The 
two scientists then reached an even more astounding conclusion. The acoustic fingerprint 
located the grassy knoll gunman within a margin of error of plus or minus five feet in 
circumference, at the exact point behind the wooden fence where Lee Bowers had once 
seen an unidentified man standing, and Sam Holland and his five railroad co-workers, had 
seen a puff of smoke arise in the seconds after the actual shooting. There was at least one 
additional shooter working from behind the fence . Josiah Thompson, among others, had 
been right all along. 
Blakey knew instantly what he had, and so did all the other members of the Committee. 
Blakey had that sinking feeling in his own stomach now; he knew his fate would soon be 
joined to the cuckoo world where the birds had been singing "conspiracy, conspiracy, 
conspiracy" for years. Eleven days later, on December 29, 1978, by a vote of seven to 
two, the House Select Committee announced these conclusions to an astonished world. 
118 
II 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anson, Robert Sam. "They've Killed the President!" New York: Bantam, 1975. 
"Assassination: The Trail to a Verdict." Life, October 2, 1964. 
"Autopsy on the Warren Commission." Time, September 16, 1966. 
Belin, David W. "The Case Against Conspiracy." New York Times Magazine, July 15, 
1979, p. 40. 
Final Disclosure . New York: Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1988. 
November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973 . 
Blakey, G. Robert and Richard N. Billings. Fatal Hour. New York: Berkley, 1992. 
__. The Plot to Kill the President. New York: New York Times Books, 1981 . 
Burnham, David. "Assassination Panel Facing Budget Trim." New York Times, January 
25, 1977, p. 17. 
__. "Assassination Panel Is Warned on Its Techniques." New York Times, January 
6, 1977, p. 15. 
__. "Assassination Panel's Fate in Doubt as Sprague Faces New Allegations." New 
York Times, February 12, 1977, p. 11 . 
__.. "Assassination Study Requests $13 Million." New York Times, December 10, 
1976,p. 19. 
__. "Gonzalez, Assailing His Committee, Quits as Assassination Inquiry Head." 
New York Times, March 3, 1977, p. 1. 
119 
__. ''House Gives Assassination Panel Authority to Continue Temporarily." New 
York Times, February 3, 1977, p. 21. 
''New Assassination Panel is Blocked." New York Times, January 12, 1977. 
" Sprague Ouster Is Upset by Panel on Assassination-" New York Times, 
February 10, 1977, p. 1. 
Cohen, Jacob. "Conspiracy Fever." Commentary, October 1975. 
Corliss, Richard. "Who Killed JFK?" Time, December 23, 1991. 
Crenshaw, Charles A., M.D., with Hansen, Jens, and Shaw, J. Gary. JFK: Conspiracy 
ofSilence. New York: Signet, 1992. 
Davison, Jean. Oswald's Game. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1983 . 
''Dispute on JFK Assassination Evidence Persists." Boston Sunday Globe, June 21, 
1981. 
Duffy, James R. Who Killed JFK? New York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1988. 
Epstein, Edward Jay. The Assassination Chronicles. New York: Carroll & Graf, 
1992. 
Evica, George Michael. And We Are All Mortal: New Evidence and Analysis in the 
Assassination ofJohn F. Kennedy. West Hartford, Conn.: University of Hartford 
Press, 1978. 
"Ex-Officer Suspects He Chased '2nd Gun."' Dallas Morning News, August 20, 
1978. 
120 
Fensterwald, Bernard, Jr. , and Michael Ewing. Coincidence or Conspiracy. New 
York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 1977. 
Fonzi, Gaeton. "The Last Investigation." Third Decade, November 1984. 
Gandolfo, Ted. The House Select Committee on Assassinations Coverup [sic]. 
Self-published, 1987. 
Garrison, Jim. On The Trail ofthe Assassins. New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1988. 
Groden, Robert and Peter Model. J.F.K.: The Case for Conspiracy. New York: Manor 
Books, 1976. 
Groden, Robert J. , and Harrison Edward Livingstone. High Treason. New York: 
Berkley Books, 1990. 
"Hill Unit Open Hearings on JFK." Washington Post, September 6, 1978, p. A6. 
''House Inquiry Into Killing ofKennedys and King Due." New York Times, September 
15, 1976, p. 24. 
' 'House Panel Claims Plots Likely in JFK, King Slayings." Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 
December 31, 1978. 
Hurt, Henry. Reasonable Doubt: An Investigation into the Assassination ofJohn F. 
Kennedy. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1986. 
Investigation ofthe Assassination ofPresident John F. Kennedy. Book V. Final 
Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, with Respect 
to Intelligence Activities. U.S. Senate, 197 6. 
"JFK Film May Reveal Two Gunmen." Dallas Morning News, December 19, 1978. 
"JFK-King Panel Seeks Seclusion." Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 21 , 1977. 
121 
"JFK Panel Photo Expert Alleges Cover-Up ." Fort Worth Star-Telegram, May 16, 
1979. 
"JFK: Settling Some Doubts." Newsweek, September 18, 1978. 
"J.FK.: The Mystery Unraveled (Reprinted from Spotlight), Liberty Lobby, Inc. 
1986. 
Lane, Mark. A Citizen's Dissent. New York: Dell, 1975 . 
__. Plausible Denial. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1991. 
Lardner, George, Jr. "JFK Panel Gets Evidence of Conspiracy." Washington Post, 
December 21, 1978, p. Al. 
''Warren Commission Backed." Washington Post, September 8, 1978, p. Al. 
Livingstone, Harrison E. ''Parkland Doctors' Testimony Shows Autopsy Photos Forged." 
Baltimore Chronicle, July 30, 1979. 
Meagher, Sylvia. Accessories After the Fact. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967. 
Melanson, Philip H . Spy Saga: Lee Harvey Oswald and U.S. Intelligence. New York: 
Praeger, 1990. 
North, Mark. Act of Treason: The Role ofJ. Edgar Hoover in the Assassination of 
President Kennedy. New York: Carroll & Graf, 1991. 
Oxford, Edward. "Destiny in Dallas." American History Illustrated, November 1988. 
Polikoff, Jerry. "Investigation That Were Bound to Fail." Gallery, July 1979. 
Posner, Gerald. Case Closed. New York: Random House, 1993. 
Prouty, L. Fletcher. J.FK.: The CIA, Vietnam and the Plot to Assassinate John F 
Kennedy. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1992. 
122 
~ 
Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination ofPresident John F. 
Kennedy, and twenty-six accompanying volumes ofHearings and Exhibits, 
1964; published by U.S. Government Printing Office and also Doubleday, 
McGraw-Hill, Bantam, Popular Library and Associated Press, 1964. 
Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House ofRepresentatives, 
and twelve accompanying volumes ofHearings and Appendices (on Kennedy case 
as opposed to Martin Luther King assassination), 1979, published by U.S . 
Government Printing Office; and Report (only) by Bantam, New York, 1979, 
under title The Final Assassinations Report. 
Roffman, Howard. Presumed Guilty. Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1975. 
Scheim, David. Contract on America: The Mafia Murder ofPresident John F. 
Kennedy. New York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1988. 
Sprague, Richard E . The Taking ofAmerica 1-2-3. Self-published, 1976. 
Wicker, Tom. "Does 'J.F.K.' Conspire Against Reason?" New York Times, December 
15, 1991. 
123 
VITA 
TIMOTHY ALLAN SMITH 
52998 Twin Lakeview Drive 
Dowagiac, Michigan 4904 7 
Birthdate 
October 25 , 1956 Dowagiac, Michigan 
EDUCATION 
1983 Liberal Arts Associate of Arts Southwestern Michigan College 
Bachelor of Science Western Michigan University 1985 Religion 
History (cum laude) 
1998 Liberal Studies Master of Liberal Studies Indiana University South Bend 
MAJOR RESEARCH INTERESTS 
Political Assassinations 
Philosophy 
Religious and Biblical Studies 
Classical Literature 
HOBBIES 
Reading 
Baseball 
Creating Guides 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Southwestern Michigan College Composition, Literature, Philosophy, 198 7 - present 
Religion, Film Studies, Speech, History 
